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Oct 9, 2026
Integrity Technology Group: SafeBreach Coverage for CISA Alert AA26-281A
Learn how SafeBreach maps AA26-281A to simulations that test your exposure to the campaign’s activities being used to target and steal sensitive data from organizations worldwide, including U.S. critical infrastructure sectors.
Summary
Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA26-281A, published October 8, 2026 and led by the FBI with CISA, the NSA, and seven international partners, details how Chinese government-linked threat actors enabled by the Integrity Technology Group combine automated scanning, large-scale botnets, and hands-on exploitation to steal sensitive data from organizations worldwide.
The threat actors use TTPs consistent with activity publicly tracked as Flax Typhoon, Ethereal Panda, and Red Juliett.
They scan for exposed services with open source tooling and a custom platform containing over 1,300 penetration testing scripts, gain access through cross-site scripting and password spraying against Microsoft Exchange, establish persistence by installing legitimate SoftEther VPN clients renamed to mimic Windows binaries, and exfiltrate mailboxes and Active Directory credentials with purpose-built scripts.
The advisory confirms eight successfully exploited CVEs, five of which are newly added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog.
This post outlines the campaign’s TTPs mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, summarizes the advisory’s IOCs, and covers the available SafeBreach simulations that validate whether your controls detect and block the campaign’s attacks, which involve reconnaissance and web application exploitation followed by credential access, masquerading, and covert exfiltration.
Author:
Noam Sagiv, Product Manager
On October 8, 2026, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK), Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre), Japan’s National Police Agency (NPA) and National Cybersecurity Office (NCO), New Zealand’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ), and Spain’s Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) titled
“Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data” (AA26-281A)
. This advisory provides critical intelligence on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) recovered from multiple FBI investigations into the Integrity Technology Group and the threat actors it enables.
The threat actors have targeted victims across US critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Services and Facilities, Critical Manufacturing, Healthcare and Public Health, and Information Technology, as well as US law enforcement, education, and religious organizations and victims across Southeast Asia, Africa, and North America.
What is the Integrity Technology Group Threat?
Integrity Technology Group
(Integrity Tech) is a China-based for-profit company with links to the
Chinese government
that the US Treasury Department sanctioned in January 2025 for its role in intrusions against US victims. According to the authoring organizations, Integrity Tech employs individuals who support malicious cyber activity in several ways: acquiring or building offensive cyber tools for use and sale, acquiring and hosting infrastructure, and directly compromising victim networks. The services Integrity Tech provides feed the broader Chinese cyber ecosystem, which aims to exfiltrate sensitive data from victims worldwide.
The threat actors enabled by Integrity Tech use TTPs consistent with the cyber activity publicly known as Flax Typhoon, Ethereal Panda, and Red Juliett, among others. The advisory notes an important caveat: cybersecurity companies use different methods of tracking and attributing cyber actors, and these may not map 1:1 to the US government’s own methodology. The authoring organizations also note that these threat actors may perform activity unassociated with Integrity Tech.
The activity is long-running. The threat actors have used the MicroScan penetration testing platform as early as 2017, and have been gaining access to victim networks and cloud services since at least mid-January 2021. What distinguishes this campaign is not novel malware but the industrial pairing of two modes of operation: large-scale automated scanning and botnet infrastructure that identifies soft targets at volume, and hands-on operators who then exploit what the automation finds. That botnet infrastructure has a track record: in September 2024, the FBI, NSA, and international partners
reported
that Integrity Tech controlled a botnet of more than 260,000 compromised routers and IoT devices, which researchers at Lumen’s Black Lotus Labs
tracked as Raptor Train
and assessed was likely operated by Flax Typhoon. The actors lean heavily on open source tooling and legitimate software—living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques, commodity scanners pulled from GitHub, and an open-source VPN client—which keeps their footprint close to the noise floor of normal enterprise activity.
The objective throughout is data theft, specifically email. The FBI recovered an archived email database used to target victim organizations, and observed the actors restricting access to exfiltrated data to IP addresses originating in Xiamen, China.
Recent PRC-linked advisories SafeBreach has covered include
Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Espionage Campaigns (AA25-239A)
and
Volt Typhoon (AA24-038A)
. For the full set of government guidance, see CISA’s
People’s Republic of China Cyber Threat
page.
Integrity Technology Group TTPs Mapped to MITRE ATT&CK
The advisory maps Integrity Technology Group’s activity to
MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise, version 19
.
Reconnaissance
Integrity Technology Group uses a range of open source scanning tools to find vulnerabilities in networks and web applications [
T1595.002
], including BBScan, dirsearch, Fscan, ksubdomain, masscan, Nmap, OneForAll, ShuiZe, and WPScan. They concentrate on ports 21 (FTP), 22 (SSH), 53 (DNS), 80 (HTTP), 443 (HTTPS), and 1080 (SOCKS), and when scanning websites with dirsearch they attempt to enumerate PHP and ASP (.NET) pages. The reliance on commodity GitHub tooling suggests the actors are hunting for the most vulnerable targets rather than pursuing specific victims.
Since at least 2017, the actors have also operated MicroScan, a Python-based web application containing over 1,300 penetration testing scripts written to scan websites for specific vulnerabilities. The scripts target services including OpenSSL, Oracle WebLogic Server, Rejetto HFS, WordPress, Juniper ScreenOS, Jenkins, and Apache Struts.
Initial Access
Integrity Technology Group executes cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks that leverage unwitting third-party applications to modify content on a webpage [
T1189
]. The FBI recovered one such payload: when executed on a vulnerable website, it modifies the page to display username and password fields, harvesting credentials from users who enter them. After submission, the payload generates a link to a password-protected .zip archive whose contents are decoded from bytes embedded in the payload itself and which contains the executable live700_v1.exe.
Execution
Access to victim networks and cloud services comes primarily through command line utilities built on exploit code written in Python [
T1059.006
] and Go. Integrity Technology Group uses JavaScript [
T1059.007
] and HTML to execute the XSS attacks described above. SoftEther installers are downloaded onto Windows victim devices using PowerShell and LOTL binaries [
T1059.001
], and the Linux-based office-cli utility [
T1059.004
] continuously targets and accesses Microsoft 365 accounts to automate mail exfiltration using configuration files including client_id, tenant_id, and secret.
Integrity Technology Group also uses EBurst, an open source Python tool, to target Microsoft Office 365 accounts. EBurst compromises email accounts on Microsoft Exchange servers through multiple interfaces: Exchange Control Panel (ECP), Exchange Web Services (EWS), Offline Address Book (OAB), Outlook Web Access (OWA), Remote Procedure Call (RPC), API, MAPI, PowerShell, Autodiscover, and Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync. The authoring organizations specifically recommend that network defenders cover all of these interfaces when defending against EBurst.
Persistence
To establish persistence, Integrity Technology Group installs virtual private network (VPN) software clients on victim devices [
T1133
] to obfuscate command and control (C2) communications and frustrate attribution. They typically download SoftEther installers from actor-controlled infrastructure using PowerShell or LOTL binaries on Windows, and curl or wget on Linux/Unix, then configure the client to reconnect automatically on startup. The advisory notes that endpoint detection software is less likely to flag SoftEther because it is legitimate VPN software. SoftEther has been a Flax Typhoon signature since Microsoft
first named the group in 2023
.
Defense Evasion
Integrity Technology Group runs executables under the names of known, legitimate Windows software to evade detection [
T1036.003
]. Observed examples include naming SoftEther installers conhost.exe or dllhost.exe, and the live700_v1.exe payload spawning a process named DiagTrack.exe, which then establishes encrypted communications over HTTP with the domain dns.studiocloud[.]xyz—a domain the FBI attributes to Integrity Tech.
Credential Access
Integrity Technology Group uses DC.exe to execute the DCSync replication technique [
T1003.006
], copying account credentials, group membership details, and trust relationships out of Active Directory. DC.exe binds to the victim’s domain controller over RPC and uses the Directory Replication Service to retrieve a handle to the local security policy object, then queries the DNS domain name, domain security identifier (SID), and domain replication epoch.
Against Microsoft Exchange, the actors use eburst.py to conduct both password spraying [
T1110.003
] and password guessing [
T1110.001
] to compromise email accounts.
Collection
Integrity Technology Group created a bot using the PHP script Curlc4.txt to obtain victim emails. The script interfaces with the Microsoft EWS API, giving the actors access to email and content items such as calendars and contacts [
T1114.002
]. Before exfiltration the bot compresses emails and, in some instances, encrypts them using RC4 or AES-128-CBC [
T1560.003
]. When no root directory is supplied as an argument, the script searches for a writeable directory to stage data in [
T1074.001
], walking /, /home, /var/www, /usr, and /var/tmp.
The actors also stage exfiltration data under innocuous file names to minimize detection of MySQL email dumps, including 001.gif, Css.js, Include.png, M2k.js, M2k_list.js, and M2k_ui_adm.js.
Exfiltration
The PHP bot automatically uploads collected emails to a remote server [
T1020
], obfuscating the directories and files it creates and renaming its child process to crypto. The main C2 domain for the bot was natcloudservice[.]com. Integrity Technology Group maintains a custom web application that provides third-party access to stolen email content, where users pass arguments in URLs to view mail for specific accounts.
Exploited Vulnerabilities
Appendix B of the advisory lists eight CVEs successfully exploited by Integrity Technology Group, recovered from the MicroScan penetration testing scripts. Five of these were newly added to
CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog
with this advisory, marked below with an asterisk:
CVE-2014-6278
(GNU Bash, remote code execution)
CVE-2015-3306
* (ProFTPD 1.3.5, unauthorized read)
CVE-2015-5477
* (ISC BIND 9.x, denial of service)
CVE-2016-3081
* (Apache Struts, remote code execution)
CVE-2019-11510
(Pulse Connect Secure, unauthorized read)
CVE-2021-22205
(GitLab 11.9 and later, remote code execution)
CVE-2021-3199
* (ONLYOFFICE DocumentServer 5.1.5 through 5.6.2, unauthorized write)
CVE-2023-22894
* (Strapi up to 4.5.5, information disclosure)
The age of this list is itself the finding. Several of these vulnerabilities are a decade old, and their presence in a 2026 advisory means the actors are still successfully exploiting them against internet-facing systems that were never patched or never replaced.
Integrity Technology Group IOCs
The advisory provides extensive IOCs across Appendix A, including:
Observed domain names and IP addresses associated with the threat activity
Domain names attributed to threat activity and obfuscation network hosts, annotated by type (infrastructure, SoftEther host) with first-seen and last-seen dates
Leveraged webshells, binaries, and scripts
Potentially dropped files
For the full list of IOCs, download the AA26-281A STIX XML or STIX JSON bundles referenced in the advisory. The authoring organizations recommend vetting older indicators before blocking—some date back to 2016, and their current ownership may have changed.
Organizations should hunt for the tooling and artifacts named throughout the advisory, including SoftEther installers renamed to conhost.exe or dllhost.exe, processes named DiagTrack.exe making outbound HTTP connections, DC.exe, office-cli, and the staging file names used for MySQL email dumps.
SafeBreach Coverage & Playbook Attack Updates
Existing Behavioral Coverage
SafeBreach already simulates several of the attacker behaviors detailed in this campaign. The following 15 existing attacks are now mapped to Integrity Technology Group:
Recon / Web-App Exploitation
#8019: Port scanning target simulator
#8018: Web application port scanning
#6604: XSS- Cross Site Scripting via URL parameters
#6605: SQLi- SQL injection via URL parameters
#6877: Path Traversal Attack- GET request
#4271: Remote exploitation of Pulse VPN vulnerability CVE-2019-11510 (WAF)
Credential access
#5833: Extract Login Information using MimiKatz DCSync
#6801: Credential harvesting using Mimikatz DCSync with interactive session token
#6802: Credential harvesting using Mimikatz DCSync with user credentials
#7169: Dump the SAM database from the registry (Windows)
#9456: Extract SAM credentials from registry
#258: Brute force attack over the HTTP/S protocol
Defense evasion
#2248: Masquerading
Collection / Exfiltration
#6975: Covert archived data asset exfiltration using HTTP/S POST
#107: Covert data asset exfiltration using HTTP/S POST
These simulations are mapped to
MITRE ATT&CK
and can be used immediately to validate detection and response capabilities across your infrastructure.
New IOC-Based Coverage
To address the newly released IOC guidance, SafeBreach has added the following 11 new attacks:
#11835: Email bx_shell (38ade9) webshell as a compressed attachment
#11825: Write fscan (2480e9) hacktool to disk
#11826: Pre-execution phase of fscan (2480e9) hacktool (Windows)
#11827: Transfer of fscan (2480e9) hacktool over HTTP/S
#11828: Transfer of fscan (2480e9) hacktool over HTTP/S
#11829: Email fscan (2480e9) hacktool as a compressed attachment
#11830: Email fscan (2480e9) hacktool as a compressed attachment
#11831: Write bx_shell (38ade9) webshell to disk
#11832: Transfer of bx_shell (38ade9) webshell over HTTP/S
#11833: Transfer of bx_shell (38ade9) webshell over HTTP/S
#11834: Email bx_shell (38ade9) webshell as a compressed attachment
How to Test Your Defenses Against Integrity Technology Group with SafeBreach
SafeBreach customers can now validate their security controls against these TTPs in multiple ways.
Method 1
– SafeBreach Scenarios:
Navigate to the SafeBreach Scenarios page and choose CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY Integrity Tech.
Method 2
–
Attack Playbook:
From the Attack Playbook, filter by the threat name CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY Integrity Tech or search for the attack IDs listed above.
Method 3 — Known Threats Series:
Open the Known Threats Series report, select the CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY Integrity Tech report, and run the simulations.
Additional Advisory Steps
What are mitigation strategies for Integrity Technology Group?
The authoring organizations recommend the following, prioritized here for the behaviors in this advisory:
Require multifactor authentication (MFA) across all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, VPNs, and accounts that access critical systems.
Patch and update software and firmware promptly, prioritizing the eight CVEs in Appendix B, and replace end-of-life products with supported alternatives.
Sanitize user input in web applications to prevent XSS payload injection, and review web application access logs for directory traversal, command injection, and enumeration attempts.
Disable unused services and ports, and configure applications to reveal as little information as possible in login pages and banners.
Replace default passwords, limit and audit accounts with administrative privileges, and apply least privilege.
Implement network segmentation so a compromised device cannot reach another organizational unit’s sensitive resources.
What are proactive threat monitoring activities for Integrity Technology Group?
Hunt for unauthorized SoftEther installations.
Look for SoftEther clients configured to reconnect on startup, especially installers named conhost.exe or dllhost.exe in non-standard paths.
Watch for unexpected Active Directory replication.
DCSync activity from any host that is not a domain controller is the single highest-value detection for this campaign.
Instrument every Exchange authentication interface.
Password spraying through OAB, EWS, MAPI, Autodiscover, and ActiveSync frequently bypasses monitoring that only covers OWA.
Flag masqueraded processes.
Alert on known Windows binary names running from unexpected paths or making unexpected outbound HTTP connections.
Monitor for high outbound upload volumes
from workstations and servers that normally upload far less than they download—the signature of staged mailbox exfiltration.
Stay Ahead with SafeBreach
For a complete view of your security gaps against Integrity Technology Group’s attacks, sign into SafeBreach and run the latest simulations mapped to CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY Integrity Tech. In addition to testing your defenses against the reconnaissance and web application exploitation followed by credential access, masquerading, and covert exfiltration outlined in this advisory, you can go a step further with
SafeBreach Propagate
.
Propagate enables you to assess how attackers could pivot across your environment post-compromise. It maps high-risk attack paths, visualizes lateral movement, and prioritizes remediation efforts based on exposure to your most critical assets. Learn more in the
SafeBreach Propagate solution brief
.
About the Author
Noam Sagiv
is a Product Manager at SafeBreach leading attack content for the SafeBreach CTEM Platform. Before SafeBreach, she spent five years in Israel’s Unit 8200, where she led teams building data-driven intelligence products used by more than 10,000 users.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA26-281A?
AA26-281A is a joint Cybersecurity Advisory published October 8, 2026, and led by the FBI, co-sealed by CISA, the NSA, and cybersecurity agencies in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Spain. The advisory describes how
Chinese government-linked threat actors
, enabled by the China-based Integrity Technology Group, combine automated scanning, botnets, and hands-on exploitation to steal sensitive data. Targets include US critical infrastructure, law enforcement, education, and religious organizations, as well as victims across Southeast Asia, Africa, and North America.
What tools and infrastructure do the AA26-281A threat actors use?
The AA26-281A threat actors rely almost entirely on open source and legitimate software. For reconnaissance they use BBScan, dirsearch, Fscan, ksubdomain, masscan, Nmap, OneForAll, ShuiZe, and WPScan, plus a custom platform called MicroScan containing over 1,300 penetration testing scripts. They use EBurst against Microsoft Exchange, SoftEther VPN for persistence, DC.exe for DCSync, and a PHP bot and the office-cli utility to collect and exfiltrate email.
Which vulnerabilities are being exploited in AA26-281A?
Appendix B of AA26-281A lists eight successfully exploited CVEs: CVE-2014-6278, CVE-2015-3306, CVE-2015-5477, CVE-2016-3081, CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2021-22205, CVE-2021-3199, and CVE-2023-22894. Five of these—CVE-2015-3306, CVE-2015-5477, CVE-2016-3081, CVE-2021-3199, and CVE-2023-22894—were newly added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog alongside the advisory. All eight affect internet-facing products, and several are more than a decade old.
Who is behind the attacks outlined in AA26-281A, and what are they doing?
The activity is attributed to Chinese government-linked threat actors enabled by the Integrity Technology Group, a China-based for-profit company with links to the Chinese government. The authoring organizations state the actors use TTPs consistent with activity publicly tracked as Flax Typhoon, Ethereal Panda, and Red Juliett. Their objective is data theft, primarily email: they collect account credentials and exfiltrate mailbox data from on-premise systems and cloud services, in some cases restricting access to stolen data to IP addresses in Xiamen, China.
How can organizations test their exposure to the threats outlined in AA26-281A?
SafeBreach customers can validate controls against AA26-281A three ways. Navigate to the SafeBreach Scenarios page and select CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY Integrity Tech; filter the Attack Playbook by CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY Integrity Tech; or open the Known Threats Series report, select the CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY Integrity Tech report, and run the simulations. Each path executes simulations mapped to the advisory’s MITRE ATT&CK techniques so teams can confirm whether their controls detect the reconnaissance and web application exploitation followed by credential access, masquerading, and covert exfiltration outlined in the advisory.
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