暴露在公网的 FortiGate 与 SSL VPN 凭据被大规模收集,泄露即边界失守。
凭据窃取vpn事件报告
Oct 7, 2026
FortiBleed: SafeBreach Coverage for Joint Cybersecurity Advisory JCSA-20261006-01
Learn how SafeBreach maps JCSA-20261006-01 to simulations that test your exposure to the FortiBleed credential-harvesting campaign against Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPNs.
Summary
The FBI and US Secret Service issued Joint Cybersecurity Advisory JCSA-20261006-01 on October 6, 2026. It covers FortiBleed, a global operation that harvests credentials and sells access to internet-exposed Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN gateways.
The activity was observed between June 18 and July 23, 2026, and the advisory warns that scanning is ongoing. SOCRadar has verified more than 86,644 FortiGate devices with working stolen credentials across 194 countries.
The attackers use password spraying and credential stuffing to get in, steal FortiOS user databases and session tokens, and crack weak SHA-256 hashes offline on rented GPUs. They then create rogue admin accounts, map Active Directory and lock out the real administrators.
The campaign doesn’t exploit a vulnerability. It relies on reused, leaked, and weakly stored credentials, and it has given INC/Lynx and Payload ransomware affiliates a way in.
This post outlines the campaign’s TTPs mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. It also summarizes the advisory’s IOCs, SafeBreach simulations that validate whether your controls detect and block the campaign’s brute force, password spraying, Active Directory discovery, exfiltration, and command-and-control communication, and steps to harden FortiGate environments.
Author:
Noam Sagiv, Product Manager
On October 6, 2026, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the US Secret Service (USSS) released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory titled
“FortiBleed Operations Continue Targeting Exposed Systems Leading to Reports of Lockouts” (Product ID: JCSA-20261006-01)
. This advisory provides critical intelligence on the FortiBleed campaign, including its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), as well as indicators of compromise (IOCs) observed in attacks against
Fortinet
FortiGate devices.
The campaign is global and sector-agnostic: the advisory lists all 16 US critical infrastructure sectors as affected, from energy and healthcare to financial services, government facilities, and information technology. Organizations are experiencing lockouts when the actors disable or modify legitimate accounts on compromised devices.
What is the FortiBleed Threat?
FortiBleed is a credential-harvesting and initial-access-broker operation focused on the edge of the enterprise network. Rather than exploiting a software flaw, the actors abuse the credentials that protect FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN gateways. These credentials are often reused, previously leaked, or stored using legacy SHA-256 hashing that is practical to crack at scale.
The operation is industrialized. The actors scan the internet for exposed FortiGate SSL VPN portals, run password spraying and credential stuffing against them, and pull FortiOS user databases and session tokens from the devices they reach. Harvested hashes are fed into a distributed cracking pipeline built on Hashcat and Hashtopolis, running on rented GPU infrastructure.
Scale is what sets FortiBleed apart.
SOCRadar
verified more than 86,644 FortiGate devices with working stolen credentials across 194 countries, and
independent technical analysis from CloudSEK
of an exposed FortiBleed open directory shows the tooling the actors left behind.
Fortinet’s PSIRT
has also published its own analysis of the reported credential compromise, noting that the same actor has reportedly used brute force credential harvesting against other vendors’ devices, so the exposure is not limited to FortiGate.
The downstream impact extends well beyond the firewall. Once inside, the actors create new administrative accounts for persistence, enumerate Active Directory to prepare for lateral movement, and remove legitimate users’ access. According to the advisory, this access chain has served as an initial entry point for ransomware affiliates, including
INC/Lynx
and Payload ransomware.
FortiBleed TTPs Mapped to MITRE ATT&CK
The advisory maps FortiBleed activity to the following MITRE ATT&CK techniques.
Resource Development
Acquire Infrastructure
(
T1583
): The actors rented GPU infrastructure to crack password hashes at scale.
Reconnaissance and Initial Access
Active Scanning
(
T1595
): The actors scanned the internet for exposed FortiGate SSL VPN portals.
Exploit Public-Facing Application
(
T1190
): The actors targeted publicly exposed FortiGate infrastructure.
Password Spraying
(
T1110.003
): The actors attempted a small set of common passwords across many accounts.
Credential Stuffing
(
T1110.004
): The actors used credentials obtained from prior breaches.
Persistence
Create Local Account
(
T1136.001
): The actors created new administrative accounts on FortiGate devices, often with names designed to blend in, such as variations of “admin,” “support,” and “fortinet.”
Credential Access
OS Credential Dumping
(
T1003
): The actors extracted FortiOS user databases and session tokens.
Password Cracking
(
T1110.002
): The actors used Hashcat and Hashtopolis for distributed offline cracking of harvested hashes.
Discovery
Account Discovery
(
T1087
): The actors enumerated Active Directory to support lateral movement.
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
(
T1041
): Harvested credentials were transmitted to attacker-controlled servers.
Impact
Account Access Removal
(
T1531
): The actors locked, disabled, or altered account access, producing the lockouts the advisory warns about.
The advisory does not reference any Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs). The attack chain depends on credential exposure and weak password storage rather than a specific FortiOS vulnerability.
FortiBleed IOCs
The advisory provides IOCs, including:
Attacker infrastructure IP addresses, including a command-and-control (C2) server, proxy nodes, a beacon relay, and a Hashtopolis cracking server.
More than a dozen IP addresses observed conducting attacks between June 18 and July 23, 2026, with observation dates for each.
Account names the actors created or used on compromised FortiGate devices (e.g., forticloud-sync, support_fortinet, adminsslvpn).
For the full list of IOCs, refer to the
advisory PDF
.
Organizations should audit FortiGate local and administrator accounts against the advisory’s account-name list and review firewall, VPN, and authentication logs for connections from the listed IP addresses.
SafeBreach Coverage & Playbook Attack Updates
Existing Behavioral Coverage
SafeBreach already simulates several of the attacker behaviors detailed in this campaign. The following 11 existing attacks are now mapped to FortiBleed:
Brute force:
#173 Brute force attack over SSH protocol
#11771 Brute force attack over SSH protocol against a live service
#258 Brute force attack over the HTTP/S protocol
Password spraying:
#11666, #11667 and #11668 Password Spray on Fake Domain Accounts via SMB, LDAP and Kerberos
Active Directory discovery:
#11543 Extract domain users using net.exe (Windows)
#6578 Discover domain users using LDAP method
#8890 Dump Active Directory data using ldifde
Exfiltration:
#107 Covert data asset exfiltration using HTTP/S POST
#110 Covert data asset exfiltration using HTTPS POST
NOTE:
Simulation #11771 is an Advanced Action because it repeatedly authenticates against a live service, so schedule it accordingly.
These simulations are mapped to
MITRE ATT&CK
and can be used immediately to validate detection and response capabilities across your infrastructure.
New IOC-Based Coverage
To address the newly released IOC guidance, we have added the following attack:
#11813 Communication with FortiBleed (FBI/USSS JCSA-20261006-01) using HTTP, which tests whether your controls detect and block HTTP communication with the IP addresses the advisory attributes to the campaign’s command-and-control and attack infrastructure.
The indicator is carried inside a simulated request, and no traffic reaches the actors’ infrastructure.
What You Should Do Now
SafeBreach customers can now validate their security controls against these TTPs in multiple ways.
Method 1
– SafeBreach Scenarios:
Navigate to the SafeBreach Scenarios page and choose CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY FortiBleed.
Method 2
–
Attack Playbook:
From the Attack Playbook, filter by the threat name CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY FortiBleed or search for the attack IDs listed above.
Method 3 — Known Threats Series:
Open the Known Threats Series report, select the CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY FortiBleed report, and run the simulations.
Additional Advisory Steps
How to Protect FortiGate Devices from FortiBleed
The authoring agencies recommend the following:
Reduce the management attack surface.
Restrict external management of FortiGate devices via trusted hosts, a local-in policy, or, best of all, remove internet-facing administration altogether.
Terminate sessions and reset credentials.
End all active administrative and VPN sessions, then reset all Fortinet VPN and administrative passwords, prioritizing internet-facing systems.
Require phishing-resistant MFA.
On all remote access and administrative accounts, require phishing-resistant MFA.
Move off legacy hashing.
Confirm administrator passwords use the Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) rather than legacy SHA-256. See
Fortinet’s guidance
.
Validate configurations against a baseline.
Review firewall and VPN users for unauthorized changes, and remove any unknown REST API keys.
Review logs.
Examine firewall, VPN, authentication, and domain controller logs for suspicious activity.
How to Implement Proactive Threat Monitoring
Audit FortiGate accounts.
Flag any administrator account that does not match your baseline, especially names mimicking Fortinet support or cloud-sync functions.
Alert on authentication patterns.
Watch for many accounts failing against a small set of passwords, and for successful VPN logins from the advisory’s listed IP addresses.
Watch for lockouts.
Treat unexpected administrator lockouts or disabled accounts on edge devices as a possible compromise, not a help desk ticket.
Monitor for directory enumeration.
Investigate Active Directory account discovery originating from VPN address pools or firewall-adjacent hosts.
Inventory REST API keys.
Track creation of new FortiOS API keys and remove any that cannot be attributed.
Stay Ahead with SafeBreach
To see how your controls hold up against the FortiBleed campaign, sign into SafeBreach and run the 12 simulations mapped to JCSA-20261006-01. In addition to testing your defenses against brute force, password spraying, and Active Directory enumeration, you can go a step further with
SafeBreach Propagate
.
Propagate enables you to assess how attackers could pivot across your environment post-compromise. It maps high-risk attack paths, visualizes lateral movement, and prioritizes remediation efforts based on exposure to your most critical assets. Learn more in the
SafeBreach Propagate solution brief
.
About the Author
Noam Sagiv
is a Product Manager at SafeBreach leading attack content for the SafeBreach CTEM Platform. Before SafeBreach, she spent five years in Israel’s Unit 8200, where she led teams building data-driven intelligence products used by more than 10,000 users.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is FortiBleed?
FortiBleed is a credential-harvesting campaign that targets internet-exposed Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN gateways. The FBI and US Secret Service described it in Joint Cybersecurity Advisory JCSA-20261006-01, released October 6, 2026. FortiBleed was observed between June 18 through July 23, 2026, and SOCRadar verified more than 86,644 FortiGate devices with working stolen credentials across 194 countries. The attackers don’t exploit a CVE. Instead, they use leaked and reused credentials, crack weak SHA-256 password hashes offline, create rogue administrator accounts, and lock out legitimate admins. Ransomware affiliates, including
INC/Lynx
and Payload, have used this access to get in.
What is Joint Cybersecurity Advisory JCSA-20261006-01?
JCSA-20261006-01 is a joint Cybersecurity Advisory released on October 6, 2026 by the FBI and the US Secret Service. The advisory describes FortiBleed, an active, global credential-harvesting campaign targeting internet-exposed Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN gateways. JCSA-20261006-01 warns that FortiBleed actors are locking legitimate administrators out of their devices and that the access has been used by ransomware affiliates. All 16 US critical infrastructure sectors are listed as affected.
Which systems are affected, and is there a CVE?
FortiBleed targets internet-exposed Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and FortiOS SSL VPN gateways. JCSA-20261006-01 cites no CVE. The FortiBleed campaign relies on reused and leaked credentials, password spraying, and offline cracking of FortiOS password hashes stored with legacy SHA-256. Organizations exposing FortiGate administration or SSL VPN portals to the internet, without phishing-resistant MFA or PBKDF2 password hashing, are at greatest risk.
Who is behind FortiBleed, and what are they doing?
FortiBleed is a credential-harvesting and access-broker operation. According to JCSA-20261006-01, the FortiBleed actors scan for exposed FortiGate portals, harvest FortiOS user databases and session tokens, crack hashes using Hashcat and Hashtopolis on rented GPUs, create rogue administrator accounts, and enumerate Active Directory. SOCRadar verified more than 86,644 compromised devices across 194 countries, and the access has served as an entry point for
INC/Lynx
and Payload ransomware affiliates.
How can organizations test their exposure to the threats outlined in JCSA-20261006-01?
SafeBreach customers can validate their defenses against FortiBleed by running the simulations mapped to JCSA-20261006-01. Customers can select CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY FortiBleed on the SafeBreach Scenarios page, filter the Attack Playbook by the Threat Name CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY FortiBleed, or open the Known Threat Series report and run the FortiBleed simulations. Results show whether existing controls detect and block the campaign’s brute force, password spraying, Active Directory discovery, exfiltration, and command-and-control communication.
What should FortiGate administrators do first?
FortiGate administrators should first remove or restrict internet-facing management, terminate all active administrative and VPN sessions, and reset all Fortinet VPN and administrator passwords. JCSA-20261006-01 also recommends requiring phishing-resistant MFA, confirming that administrator passwords use PBKDF2 instead of legacy SHA-256, removing unknown REST API keys, and comparing FortiGate user configurations against a known-good baseline.
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