暴露被弃养 IoT 与固件信任链的长期失效面,手法可复用。
固件tls绕过
RT @singe: eMudhra has two interesting implications for me beyond the obvious browser trust issues.
I'm excited for the opportunities to liberate closed hardware this provides. We know hardware, particularly abandoned IoT devices are unlikely to be updating their revocation lists and root CAs. This means we can potentially intercept previously encrypted comms, or sign previously protected firmware.
I'm also interested in how well the revocation works at a WiFi supplicant level. Rogue RADIUS servers (mana, wpe, eaphammer) can now use validly* signed chains for forged leafs with TLS protected EAP modes. I'm not sure how well the revocations work in that world given the difference in the CA trust model in use there.