借系统自动填充隐藏订阅价格、跳过用户确认,已在四国出现。
钓鱼移动端浏览器诈骗
RT @GenThreatLabs: The scam page can hide the price. The SMS can’t. Unless your phone does it for them, the code is offered for autofill before you ever open the message that says “every week”.
We call it #BillBait. Seen in 🇵🇱 Poland, 🇨🇭 Switzerland, 🇩🇰 Denmark and 🇨🇦 Canada. The mechanism is one line. Beyond the regulated customer text, the message carries the domain and code in a machine-readable pair: "@example[.]com #2976"
iOS and Chrome match it to the site you’re on and put the code right above the keyboard. No opening a message, no retyping. You tap the suggestion — and you’re subscribed. The SMS stating price, frequency and unsubscribe instructions never got read. For a login code that’s convenience. For operator billing that code IS the payment authorization. No card, no 3DS, no second confirmation. It starts a recurring charge on your phone bill.
iPhone showed 14.99 zł and dropped the “every week”. Chrome showed everything inside a prompt wearing Google’s authority and designed to be dismissed in half a second with an approval.
How people get the message in the first place? Ads with large font saying “Verify your phone to get full access”, 14.99 zł every week in tiny text under the banner. Not an accident.
Open the whole SMS. Check the frequency. If it’s not what you clicked for, don’t submit. And check your bill. An unfamiliar premium SMS or operator billing line means something got authorized. Call your operator, ask who’s collecting, cancel it, dispute the charge. Marking the sender as spam doesn’t stop the charges.
Full analysis: https://t.co/MPmk23JU8v
#SMS #MobilePayments #DCB