异常账号与登录类型 3 的完整排查链,可直接对照横向移动检测
dfir横向移动windows
The first thing that looked strange was not on the user’s laptop.
It was on the file server.
A workstation called WS-214 suddenly authenticated to our Finance share using an account called:
svc-reporting
That account was supposed to belong to an old reporting service.
It had no reason to be coming from a normal employee workstation.
So I checked the Security logs on the file server.
Event ID 4624 showed a successful network logon.
Logon Type: 3
The account was CORP\svc-reporting, and the source was WS-214.
A few seconds later, Event ID 5140 showed the same account accessing:
\\FS-08\Finance
Now I wanted to know what happened on the workstation before that connection.
The process logs showed PowerShell launching cmd.exe, and the command line included a net use connection to the Finance share using the service account.
That was enough to treat it as possible lateral movement.
I checked the account in Active Directory.
Its description still said:
Legacy reporting service
The password had not been changed since February 2025.
That told us something else.
This was an old service credential that had been sitting around for a long time.
We isolated WS-214, disabled the account, rotated the credentials and started checking every system that had used svc-reporting.
We also reviewed the Finance share to see what had been accessed during the session.
What stood out to me was that the attacker did not need some complicated exploit to move between systems.
They had a valid credential.
Windows accepted it.
SMB accepted it.
From the network’s point of view, the login looked legitimate.
That is why stale service accounts can be dangerous.
They normally run quietly for years, people forget who owns them, password rotation gets skipped, and eventually nobody is really watching where they are being used from.
Sometimes lateral movement does not look like an exploit.
It looks like a successful login from the wrong machine.