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混淆 PowerShell 经 curl.exe 拉取 zip,随后多阶段注入并窃取凭据

完整执行链可转成检测规则与狩猎线索,含十进制编码 IP 等规避手法。
powershell事件凭据窃取payload
RT @Kostastsale: We captured this attack as well, and managed to follow the execution chain quite a bit further. It started with the same obfuscated PowerShell command using curl.exe and a decimal-encoded IP (𝟷𝟹𝟼𝟿𝟿𝟾𝟶𝟺𝟼𝟷 → 𝟾𝟷.𝟷𝟼𝟾.𝟼𝟸.𝟺𝟻). From there, we observed multiple stages of payload delivery, persistence, process injection, and credential access. Here's what we saw: 1️⃣ PowerShell downloaded 𝚏𝚕𝚘𝚖𝚘𝚘𝚏𝟷.𝚣𝚒𝚙 from 𝚖𝚊𝚒𝚕𝚍𝚎𝚟𝚎𝚕𝚘𝚙𝚎𝚛.𝚜𝚒𝚝𝚎, extracted it under AppData\Local\ExFiles, and executed 𝚏𝚕𝚘𝚖𝚘.𝚎𝚡𝚎. 2️⃣ flomo.exe established persistence through the user Run key (𝚎𝚕𝚎𝚌𝚝𝚛𝚘𝚗.𝚊𝚙𝚙.𝚏𝚕𝚘𝚖𝚘), then extracted and launched 𝚄𝚝𝚒𝚕𝚒𝚝𝚢𝙿𝚒𝚡𝚎.𝚎𝚡𝚎. 3️⃣ UtilityPixe.exe copied itself to 𝙲:\𝙿𝚛𝚘𝚐𝚛𝚊𝚖𝙳𝚊𝚝𝚊\𝚑𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚕𝚎𝚛_𝚍𝚋𝚐_𝚍𝚎𝚟\ and staged a legacy scheduled task file (JSONGateway_debug.job). 4️⃣ It then spawned XenoMixe.exe suspended and modified its thread context using 𝚆𝚘𝚠𝟼𝟺𝚂𝚎𝚝𝚃𝚑𝚛𝚎𝚊𝚍𝙲𝚘𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚡𝚝. 5️⃣ 𝚇𝚎𝚗𝚘𝙼𝚒𝚡𝚎.𝚎𝚡𝚎 accessed Edge's Cookies, Local State, and Login Data files, registered raw keyboard input hooks, and injected into an active Edge process using SetThreadContext. 6️⃣ Browser data was staged into temporary directories and .7z archives. We also observed AD reconnaissance using net group "domain computers" /dom. 7️⃣ Network activity included 𝚐𝚙𝚝𝚌𝚖𝚍.𝚒𝚘 and outbound connections to multiple IPs on ports 2222/2223. One thing worth noting is that we confirmed access to browser credential stores and data staging, but couldn't verify successful exfiltration from the available network telemetry. IOCs: 𝟺𝟻[.]𝟷𝟹𝟷[.]𝟸𝟷𝟺[.]𝟸𝟹𝟿:𝟸𝟸𝟸𝟸 ➔  attempted a TCP connection from 𝚇𝚎𝚗𝚘𝙼𝚒𝚡𝚎.𝚎𝚡𝚎 𝟾𝟺[.]𝟸𝟻𝟸[.]𝟼𝟼[.]𝟷𝟽𝟼  ➔ XenoMixe.exe attempted TCP connections on ports 2222 and 2223 𝚐𝚙𝚝𝚌𝚖𝚍[.]𝚒𝚘 ➔  Resolved by the injected malware process 𝚇𝚎𝚗𝚘𝙼𝚒𝚡𝚎.𝚎𝚡𝚎 to establish bidirectional network communication on TCP ports 3333 and 3334, operating as C2. 𝚖𝚊𝚒𝚕𝚍𝚎𝚟𝚎𝚕𝚘𝚙𝚎𝚛[.]𝚜𝚒𝚝𝚎 ➔ Repeatedly resolved by a staging executable (flomo.exe) and served as the source for downloading malicious payloads during staging of additional components. 𝚑𝚝𝚝𝚙://𝟾𝟷\[.]𝟷𝟼𝟾\[.]𝟼𝟸\[.]𝟺𝟻/𝚓𝚎𝚜𝚜/𝚊𝚙𝚒?𝚝=<𝚄𝙸𝙳>&𝚝𝚛𝚊𝚌𝚔=𝟷&𝚎𝚟𝚎𝚗𝚝=𝚍𝚕_𝚘𝚔 𝟾𝟷[.]𝟷𝟼𝟾[.]𝟼𝟸[.]𝟺𝟻 ➔ The IP that the loader contacted