经 SOCKS5 代理、以中文报错判真的布尔盲注手法可以迁移复用。
sqli事件工具
RT @Huntio: Three open directories on the same host, captured over five weeks. All of them pointing at one target: Tamkang University in Taiwan 🇹🇼
The operator built a custom blind SQLi framework against the university’s IP registration system at 163.13.240[.]200. Boolean oracle over SOCKS5, TRUE/FALSE detection via Chinese error strings.
The companion script enumerates information_schema, samples rows from 10 tables. The output file confirms it worked: 212 IP ranges, 170 support tickets going back to 2005, full network inventory with usernames, department codes, room numbers, phone extensions, equipment, OS types.
On a different port, the same server holds SEP14E64A.exe, a Windows RAT named to look like a Symantec installer. WSS C2 via SChannel, systeminfo beacon, file transfer with chunking and resume, process/registry/service enumeration, browser detection. Config is encoded behind a CFG! marker, not plaintext. Next to it: wisp_agent_linux, a Go binary with shell + SOCKS components supporting five transport modes including DNS.
Then the http.log on :8899. A TANet IP (163.13.121[.]218, MoE Computer Center TW) listed the directory and pulled bdgrab.exe with a 200 on Oct 11.
The server also stages credential stuffing scripts, SSH pivots via sshpass and Paramiko, MS17-010/EternalBlue targeting five Tamkang hosts, CVE-2023-46604 ActiveMQ payload builders, and FortiSIEM CVE-2025-25256 + CVE-2025-64155 PoCs.
No actor attributed.