⚡Megatron LLM Hub
All digests
Twitter

推特安全流

Top5

绕过微软内核级凭据隔离的完整可复现路径,直接威胁 Windows 域环境凭据安全

Runtime Credential Guard Deactivation New Medium post, in this one we will see how to bypass Windows Credential Guard at runtime by signaling an undocumented named kernel event inside LsaIso.exe, and then just dump the lsass process and it’s user hashes https://t.co/XMOtq00h4l

凭据窃取lsasswindows绕过 @Salsa12__ source ↗

可直接上手验证 WAF 绕过手法,也说明补 PHP 比堆 WAF 更关键。

Always have enjoyed CTFs. So I Asked the team to build one for the php2shell CVEs. Stock PHP 8.5.11 behind our WAF with default rules. Find a way around and read /flag and report to earn bounty. REMINDER - WAF buys you time. It isn't bulletproof. Upgrade your PHP. https://t.co/Mg8MZipruQ

绕过pocphpctf @dok2001 source ↗

容器与多租户主机默认受影响,暂只能靠限制非特权 userns 与 seccomp 缓解。

RT @sysdig: 🚨 A working root exploit for a Linux kernel bug is public. No CVE. No merged fix. ZDI-CAN-33367 is a gap in the Dirty Frag fix, with root confirmed on current Ubuntu, Debian, and AlmaLinux. Restrict unprivileged user namespaces and enforce seccomp RuntimeDefault while you wait. https://t.co/yprwlq2US4 #CloudSecurity #ThreatResearch #Linux #RuntimeSecurity

lpe内核poc @0xocdsec source ↗

把 macOS 研究环境搭建(含关 SIP)全自动化,是可上手的本地 agent 工程范例

Everyone who spends time with macOS VMs knows how tedious the process of actually setting up the VMs is. Using Apple’s Virtualization.framework directly and AppKit + ScreenCaptureKit for VM display, screenshots and CUA input - you can build a very useful tool to automate a lot of the tedious bits of macOS research. Now the agent: can download an image, get it setup/ installed/snapshotted, and create a SIP disabled version. I will never setup a MacOS VM again!

ai_agent工具虚拟化 @rad9800 source ↗
Must-see26

微软未修复的 Windows 本地提权,PoC 已存在且补丁被再次绕过

RT @karollooool: MSRC dismissed my LPE because it supposedly needs dev mode. Funny because I already sent them an updated working PoC without it like a month before they dismissed it. I appealed on Oct 15. but that obviously went into the void… There is still one small detail I’m not 100% sure about, but they didn’t even mention that in their dismissal either. And now today I managed to bypass what looks to me like a deliberate fix they introduced in build 29695.1001 (Oct 23) so it comes down to SYSTEM again… Like seriously, what the actual fuck are you trying to do here @msftsecresponse ? If anyone could connect me directly with someone from their team I would really appreciate it, because I just wanna get this sorted out already somehow. DMs are open.

lpewindows绕过cve @0xocdsec source ↗

本地可自托管的无审查安全研究模型,降低红队 LLM 工作流的部署门槛

RT @zroai_: We’ve released the weights for Dolly 2 Security, our uncensored GLM-5.3 model built for cybersecurity research. We took a targeted approach to abliteration, aiming to reduce refusals while preserving the model’s general capabilities. Download the FP8 weights and run them yourself, or use dolly2-security on Zro without setting up GPUs. https://t.co/mFP19DXuLo

llmai_agent工具自托管 @0xocdsec source ↗

LLM 自主挖洞已产出可直接 root 服务器的完整链路

RT @aegiryy: this blog shows some of the worst bugs claude found, including a zero-click rce on the linux networking stack that roots a server over the network with no creds or interaction, and tens of full rce chains in chrome (recording below is the one in the blog): https://t.co/DHkfR22s94 https://t.co/J9noyTTxZI

ai_agentllmrcepoc @rootxharsh source ↗

原厂补丁未落到设备,暴露面横跨 OT 与边界设备

RT @4A4133: Announcing 3 Critical vulns for hundreds of millions of IoT, Firewalls, OT, and Military devices including: Palo Alto Networks, Comcast, D-Link, HP, Canon, Honeywell, GE, Oracle, Siemens, Rockwell, Digi, Lockheed Martin, Boeing... The vulns are with GoAhead Web Server which is a backend library used by these devices. There's a patch available from GoAhead but that doesn't mean there's a patch available for the devices yet -- that's up to the manufacturer. - TLS traffic over DHE ciphers have a 1-byte secret, "04", meaning anyone can decrypt connections to these devices and steal login credentials and session tokens if the client negotiated with DHE ciphers like the latest TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, which is extremely likely. - LibreSSL mTLS has been completely bypassed, meaning anyone can connect over mTLS. If you have one of these devices listening on the internet and are expecting mTLS to protect it from attackers, take it offline or patch asap. - OpenSSL Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are not enforced, meaning if a user device is stolen or compromised, and you revoke that mTLS cert, nothing actually happens. There are a lot of other attacks this can be used for. These are critical because these types of devices run our world. Water systems, electricity, military, firewalls, critical infrastructure. https://t.co/AYUgNsrA0f

cve固件rce供应链 @pentest_swissky source ↗

僵尸网络已把新 CVE 写进现成利用routine,自托管 Linux 服务处于暴露窗口。

Interesting finding from my colleagues for anyone following #PHP2SHELL activity They found a Linux botnet sample that already has code targeting CVE-2026-109618 integrated into its existing exploit routines, alongside eight other CVEs

cvelinux僵尸网络exploit @cyb3rops source ↗

披露节奏与协同模式变化,直接影响自托管组件的补丁响应窗口。

RT @k8em0: PHP2Shell had everyone buzzing last week, but the multiparty vulnerability disclosure felt all too familiar. Dan Kaminsky's DNS bug was the first attempt at such large scale coordination and we should expect more like this from AI-assisted research https://t.co/aDpdQO3gb2

ai漏洞披露报告 @artem_i_baranov source ↗

未登录即可从 SQLi 打到 RCE,蜜罐已见探测,十月 CPU 外仍有未修补实例。

🚨 Our Oracle E-Business Suite decoys recorded exploratory exploits against CVE-2026-101767, an unauthenticated SQL injection in EBS's Thin Client Framework servlet that chains to remote code execution, this morning, Oct 27. The bug was recently disclosed by @Horizon3ai and patched in Oracle's October CPU. No public report exists of this CVE being attempted in the wild. Full IOCs on Defused Radar 👉 https://t.co/TTnxgi9Hv5

sqlircecve事件 @DefusedCyber source ↗

签名有效的 RMM 滥用可绕过应用白名单,IOC 与落地域名已公开。

EV signature "Space Solar Technologies LLC" Signs fake CloakGuard RMM disguised as Windows service -> fake blue screen -> installs ScreenConnect rmm[.]cloakguard[.]org 162[.]246.19.216 relay[.]alico[.]shop · 69[.]169.106.96:8041 https://t.co/ozQGmJR3Gi

供应链rmm事件签名 @SquiblydooBlog source ↗

可自托管的 AI Agent 自动读源码并实打 exploit,是 Agent 攻击面的现成样本。

shannon v3.5.0 — Shannon is an autonomous, white-box AI pentester for web applications and APIs. It analyzes your source code, identifies attack vectors, and executes real exploits to prove vulnerabilities before they reach production. https://t.co/7jDBm6BuQ9 https://t.co/7EtCv6GEOA

ai_agentllm工具poc @KitPloit source ↗

没有攻破 Anthropic 基础设施,仅靠用户信任 AI 域名并粘贴命令即可投递

RT @GenThreatLabs: Two malware campaigns are abusing Claude's content-sharing features and paid search ads to distribute malware from Anthropic's own domain. Neither campaign compromised Anthropic infrastructure. Both rely on users pasting a command they did not write. The pages are published as Artifacts and Shared Chats on https://t.co/a0p0AUOKxG and pushed to the top of search results with Google Ads. Delivery uses #ClickFix: victims are instructed to copy an obfuscated command and run it themselves. On macOS this chain installs Atomic macOS Stealer (#AMOS), which harvests browser credentials, Keychain data, crypto wallets and other personal data, then replaces the Ledger and Trezor desktop apps with trojanized versions that ask for the recovery phrase. On Windows the same pattern delivers a .NET remote-access tool that also targets cryptocurrency wallets. No exploit was required. The attack depends entirely on user action, which is why the most effective control is: do not paste commands from a browser into a shell. Full analysis: https://t.co/ezNlaAHlsn

ai_agentllm钓鱼事件 @artem_i_baranov source ↗

把 AI 工具名当作信任凭据,DGA 加 DoH 取载荷的链路完整可复现

Tricks from the past via signed ChatGPT and Claude binaries. 🎣Fake ChatGPT and Claude projects on GitHub 📦Signed binaries sideload Yoba malware 🖼️Telegram channel image seeds a DGA 🔐DNS over HTTPS retrieves payload instructions Full research 👇: https://t.co/qeabCNSUzM

ai_agent供应链dga报告 @_CPResearch_ source ↗

原生插件在运行时解密,并在 CI 与沙箱中休眠,常规检测很难发现

RT @JFrogSecurity: 🚨 testmetest goes beyond npm. JFrog Security Research identified 42 armed GitHub repositories across 11 legitimate owners hiding an npm publisher, plus a new native addon that decrypts its payload at runtime and stays dormant in CI, sandboxes, and analysis tools. The campaign spans 25 npm package names. Check whether you installed any testmetest or @iobandamwer packages and remove them if found. Full analysis: https://t.co/oLtvs4L3wU

供应链npm恶意包报告 @virusbtn source ↗

干净的 2.4.7~2.4.9 环境均可复现,无需认证即可拿下电商站点

RT @sansecio: 🚨 We discovered StyleSmuggler, an unauthenticated RCE in Magento & Adobe Commerce under active exploitation. Confirmed on clean 2.4.7, 2.4.8 and 2.4.9 installs. PHP executes during failed payment email rendering. Our research: https://t.co/8hbsdP56K9

rcecve在野利用电商 @virusbtn source ↗

AI 驱动逆向直接接进主流反编译器,Agent 化 RE 工作流已落地

RT @HexRaysSA: 📢 IDA 9.5 is here: more platforms, more agentic power. → 3 new decompilers: Android Dalvik, Infineon TriCore and Qualcomm Hexagon → IDA MCP and Assist for AI-driven reverse engineering → Recursive decompilation across call graphs → IDA Home now includes 11 cloud decompilers instead of 2, at the same price → And much, much more It’s one of our biggest releases yet. Active license holders can download it now from the Download Center. https://t.co/sNYObPyqDz

工具逆向ai_agentmcp @_winterknife_ source ↗

私钥可穷举,任意站点 HTTPS 证书都能伪造;受影响设备仍在广泛部署。

RT @IntCyberDigest: ‼️ Cisco says its IOS XR routers and Meraki cameras trust eight eMudhra certificate authorities whose private keys were numbers below 256. Anyone can recover those keys in seconds and forge HTTPS certificates for any website. Cisco is still investigating its ASA firewalls. https://t.co/Iij87zHWPX

tls固件cve @0xocdsec source ↗

签名与模板式 EDR 检测在运行时生成代码面前失效,攻防重心正在移动

RT @Teach2Breach: wrote about this years ago, but runtime code generation is the next thing. everybody scoffed when i first suggested human language hacking with ai controlling the c2, now there are c2s with mcp designed for it. the next logical step is postex code generated at runtime based on the conditions of the compromised environment. EDR based on templates and signatures will fail

ai_agentc2绕过llm @0xocdsec source ↗
Recommended15

量化 LLM 挖洞相对模糊测试的真实增量,而非空谈

RT @natashenka: LLMs are great at finding bugs, but so are fuzzers. @5aelo compared the vulnerabilities found in V8 by BigSleep, an agentic system, with those found by the Fuzzilli fuzzer. https://t.co/KTvm6k5Rhr

llm浏览器报告 @0xocdsec source ↗

完整 PoC 走通整条利用路径,手法可直接复现拆解

RT @AndrewMohawk: Apparently tweeting “I have a working PoC” creates a small obligation to explain how the thing works 😅 So here it is: both PHP bugs, the memory leaks, the ASLR bypass, worker pinning, and how I eventually got to execution https://t.co/iQy3R88cnx

poc绕过rce @0xocdsec source ↗

流程直接指向 AD 中最高风险的几类错误配置

RT @techspence: If I were still an IT admin, I’d do this quarterly on repeat until there’s nothing left. 1. Run PingCastle/PurpleKnight 2. Run ADeleginator 3. Run locksmith Then, identify the top 3-5 highest risk items. And fix them.

提权工具 @0xocdsec source ↗

逆向工具接 LLM 的成本优化思路,可迁移到自建 Agent 的检索层。

Hex-Rays IDA Assist saves ~70% in token usage in average by initially providing truncated tool responses and then learning from what models actually need by requesting specific data. The more you use it, the more token efficient it gets. https://t.co/eUydLi4qME

llm工具逆向 @in19h source ↗

题目含无解项,可直接检验 Agent 在提示攻击下的判断边界。

RT @GuanniQu: Said someone should resurrect CTF. Turns out that someone was me. I'm running the [un]prompted AI CTF, Oct 27-29, The Hibernia SF + online. https://t.co/aswURyho7I Some have no solution. We don't tell you which. https://t.co/QEpJWV272S

ai_agentctf事件 @moyix source ↗

VBS 保护的假设被运行时机制打破,PoC 代码已公开,可手工验证

Credential Guard Runtime Shutdown VBS is supposed to keep your NT hashes locked in VTL1 forever. Turns out LsaIso.exe exposes a named event that tears it all down at runtime. Steal a SYSTEM token, signal it and extract NT hashes straight from LSASS https://t.co/aBc4Ug2uTV https://t.co/06BGplYEoM

提权凭据窃取windowspoc @Salsa12__ source ↗

EDR 移出内核会改变终端攻击与绕过面,架构细节值得提前掌握

RT @cr3ghost: After CrowdStrike, Microsoft wants EDR out of the Windows kernel. A researcher named @zodiacon reversed WESP's preview: • wesp.sys minifilter • espclient.dll user-mode API • no apparent process-blocking reply path yet https://t.co/ZtgQXetz5a #WindowsInternals #EDR #ReverseEngineering

windows内核edr逆向 @0xocdsec source ↗

现成 IOC 集合可直接接入检测工程与应急响应流程。

malware-iocs — Curated Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) from Doctor Web malware investigations, published for threat intelligence, detection engineering, and incident response use. https://t.co/ZDymjk4Yym https://t.co/rkyayGAUNN

工具ioc威胁情报 @KitPloit source ↗
More79

云厂商权限审批流程的执行缺陷,但仅单方爆料无技术细节

RT @Conspiracookie: 🚨BREAKING (EXCLUSIVE): National Security Concerns Leaked by MSFT Whistleblower Leaked Microsoft screenshots show an India-based engineer received approval to view U.S. government cloud logs. A Microsoft whistleblower contacted me and shared screenshots supporting allegations that Microsoft used its “escort” process to allow an India based engineer to access Government Community Cloud (GCC) systems. The whistleblower alleges the engineer is not a U.S. citizen. Microsoft’s own published rules state that temporary elevated access to customer content in GCC requires verified U.S. citizenship. The escort model is the workaround the company uses so non-U.S. personnel can still direct the work. The screenshots show Viraj Chokhany requesting and receiving approval for escort access to view logs in the DPRODMGD151 environment, which is part of Government Community Cloud Moderate — the cloud used by many federal, state, and local agencies. In the escort process, a U.S. person is supposed to open the system while the India-based engineer guides the work. The whistleblower believes this raises urgent national security concerns and may violate FedRAMP requirements. Multiple Microsoft employees have reviewed the screenshots and confirmed they appear authentic. Viraj, has been confirmed to live in India-- Where he also attended and graduated college. The whistleblower is working on a public statement. I will release the whistleblowers statement when I receive it. Attached images are some of the screenshots that I received from the Whistleblower. @DHSgov @FBIDirectorKash @JDVance

云事件 @Teach2Breach source ↗

观点性论述,无新数据,仅作行业反思参考

One hill I'll happily die on: the normalization of "ship fast" culture at the expense of proper SDLC has played a significant role in the quality of vulnerable code being pushed into production and the rise of CVEs and enshitification of software for the last several years. We've systematically traded engineering rigor for velocity, security assurance for investor confidence, and long-term maintainability for quarterly growth. All things I wish we would second guess and reevaluate. But the software overlords wanted products yesterday and they got them. And now the rest of us get to spend the next several years discovering exactly which corners were cut and figuring out how to deal with the immense amount of responsibility that's been dropped on our collective feet.

议题sdlc @Laughing_Mantis source ↗

内存态账户隐藏手法可直接用于驻留与对抗排查

RT @init1security: Windows account hiding 101: A $ suffix skips net user but fails against PowerShells: Get-LocalUser. To fully automate deeper registry hiding, @wgpsec dropped this: https://t.co/JnjTke7qGP To avoid standard Windows disk artifacts, we translated their logic into a BOF and C# implementation to stay strictly in-memory. Definitely adding this to our training stay tune!!🕵️‍♂️

windows逃逸工具 @0xocdsec source ↗

RT @shotgunner101: This is why I went GrapheneOS when I did. Besides the targeted ads I would get through my Samsung phone I was seeing the trend of phone makers and governments pushing for clientside scanning into phones and increasing levels of telemetry. The fact your phone can decide your now allowed to see your partner in an intimate manner cause its doing clientside scanning of your private conversations should concern EVERYONE. This same tech system is used in China to surveill citizens to catch them discussing the government in negative manners, to catch them sharing or videoing protest symbols/images, etc. These companies will claim its protect people but in reality is to surveillance, censor and eventually control them. 💀

移动端隐私 @0xocdsec source ↗

固件级 AES 实现的真实攻击路径,嵌入式与 IoT 选型可作参考。

A side-channel analysis of the Arm CryptoCell-310 AES (Guillaume Bethouart) https://t.co/FY2aHJAwjY #infosec https://t.co/RVDMbPgiiQ

侧信道固件报告 @0xor0ne source ↗

完整加载链拆解,可作检测规则与样本分析的取材。

RT @InvokeReversing: We've uploaded our live stream from October 16th where we analyzed a Rust loader that uses indirect syscall resolution, AES decryption, ETW patching and multiple unpacking steps to load and execute NWHStealer. Enjoy! https://t.co/Ju5JqwAM81

malware免杀逆向 @404death source ↗

零点击投递与广告分发渠道结合,是投放链条的新形态样本。

RT @jsrailton: UPDATE: Israeli company we caught delivering zero-click infections is #1 bidder on Starlink ads in 105 countries. Data from @trendai_RSRCH suggests worldwide surveillance op targeting @Starlink users. 1/ By @razhael https://t.co/uWFzemhgnL https://t.co/FxkDlK7Xo0

zero-click监控软件事件 @NetAskari source ↗

libslirp 影响 QEMU 与容器网络栈,文附可复用的 fuzzing 方法与开源代码。

RT @quarkslab: Fuzzing complex state machines with LibAFL-QEMU and incremental snapshots. We walk through our approach, revisit CVE-2026-9539 in libslirp, and explain why our initial fuzzing campaign missed it. Fuzzer code is open source 🧑‍💻 🔗 Check it out: https://t.co/gQCwuSy7Dv

fuzzingcveqemu工具 @0xocdsec source ↗

PPL 加载原语已具备,缺的只是可用的签名 DLL,思路具备复用价值。

I can load any signed DLL into PPL protected processes. However, I can’t exploit this because each DLL checks the service name and enters an idle loop on mismatch, without exposing RPC, named pipes, or useful functionality. It’s running as PPL but offers no surface. Any ideas?

lpe绕过windows内核 @Salsa12__ source ↗

可直接上手的逆向辅助功能样例,缩短熟悉 IDA 新能力的路径。

When presenting Hex-Rays IDA Assist internally to the team, I built a set of sample programs to get more familiar Assist, covering everything from basics to cross-mesh and emulation; I adapted them for public consumption, enjoy: https://t.co/EAyAsmOuhH

工具逆向议题 @in19h source ↗

RT @calif_io: Calif researchers are at Unprompted, presenting zero-click attacks and php2shell. You don't want to miss this! Tue Oct 27, Stage 1, 16:45, "0-Click Remote Exploits in an AI World" with @pwnlambda and @brucedang Wed Oct 28, Stage 1, 14:45, "PHPocalypse: Finding, Exploiting, and Disclosing php2shell" with @lcfr_hax and @XorNinja

议题0clickphp @ilove2pwn_ source ↗

RT @vxunderground: Hello, Little People Living Inside Of My Computer, I have made my first YouTube video. I am bonking goop (malware) with a stick. I've tried to be both technical and non-technical to appeal to all nerds. This was a lot of work. I love you. https://t.co/QF4yt9AuzQ

恶意软件议题 @cgomezz_23 source ↗

My favourite LLM harness right now is unquestionably @bot. take this for example, I wanted it to go find every State of [Something] Security from 2025/2026 and it spent an hour just grinding through it. At 400+ reports - this is going to be a fun week just reading through all of these to see what and how other people think.

ai_agentllm @rad9800 source ↗

We love grep, but there's more to security code review than searching for dangerous functions and patterns. Those searches can give you useful starting points, but the real work is understanding what the application does, how its security controls work, and where its assumptions break down. A missing authorisation check won't necessarily contain a suspicious keyword, and a business logic flaw might use perfectly safe functions in the wrong order. Use grep to find places to look, but always take the time to understand what you're reviewing..

代码审计 @PentesterLab source ↗

满分漏洞已有可用利用链,未打补丁的实例大概率会被快速扫到

RT @sansecio: 🚨 BlockStrap (Magento / Adobe Commerce, CVSS 10.0) We've reproduced several RCE chains and expect threat actors to follow suit imminently. If you haven't patched yet, we strongly urge you to do so now. https://t.co/7MWkyRDb4F

rcecve电商poc @virusbtn source ↗

扫描器自动化程度高,暴露在公网的站点几乎没有缓冲窗口

RT @Unit42_Intel: We observed in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2026-102785 on a site running a vulnerable version of YOOtheme Pro two days after the patch. Scanners planted JPEG/PHP polyglot webshells in uploads, then operators deployed an ALFA webshell. Details: https://t.co/hcKC5Te6pM https://t.co/74aAW5G8qI

rcecve在野利用webshell @virusbtn source ↗

EDR 移出内核后的新接口尚未公开文档,早期理解有先发价值

RT @elasticseclabs: Microsoft wants EDR out of the Windows kernel. We checked the binaries They even come with public symbols. Full write-up from @zodiacon : https://t.co/9w3mFPIufM Microsoft's answer is the Windows Endpoint Security Platform (WESP). It's undocumented, but it already ships in Windows Insider builds. What we found: • wesp.sys: a Microsoft-built file system mini-filter at altitude 329500 • EspFilterPort: the filter communication port it uses to reach user mode • espclient.dll: 120 Esp* exports for rules, filters and event queues

内核edrwindows报告 @virusbtn source ↗

把硬件层抓包与游戏客户端 RCE 串成完整链条,手法可迁移

Think reverse engineering is just Ghidra? Gbps covers PCIe MMIO/DMA, captures PCILeech TLPs with a protocol analyzer, and breaks down a full-chain Source Engine client RCE using Frida. This blog deserves a bookmark: https://t.co/xKguwkVYeR Author: https://t.co/S55mSZYIcP #ReverseEngineering #ExploitDev #PCIe

逆向rcefrida议题 @cr3ghost source ↗

为漏洞优先级排序降温:凭据滥用与供应链才是主要入侵路径。

I actually expect AI to make software considerably more secure in the coming years. Obvious coding mistakes will become harder to find, and exploiting software vulnerabilities may become much more difficult than it is today. But you don’t need to discover a new software vulnerability to compromise most organizations. Stolen or reused credentials, phishing, session hijacking, social engineering that tricks people into executing malicious code, compromised software suppliers, trojanized applications, malicious updates, insecure configurations, exposed secrets and backups, excessive privileges, abused remote management tools, and weaknesses in authentication and business processes. There are plenty of ways into an organization that don’t require developing an exploit or discovering a new vulnerability. And AI agents can automate and combine these methods just as effectively. They can test different approaches, adapt when something fails, and work their way towards the objective. That’s what this post was about.

llm威胁建模观点 @cyb3rops source ↗

展示 agent 自主执行长链任务的能力边界,关系到其可授予的权限。

I was waiting for some research to complete and I decided to let astra have a look at some reinforcement learning work I did as a side project early 2025. Astra was very generous when it evaluated my novice attempts at training. I told it to do whatever it liked and retrain from scratch following the original constraints set out. After 30 minutes it came back and, well, you can see the results for yourself.

ai_agentllm实验 @FuzzySec source ↗

异常账号与登录类型 3 的完整排查链,可直接对照横向移动检测

The first thing that looked strange was not on the user’s laptop. It was on the file server. A workstation called WS-214 suddenly authenticated to our Finance share using an account called: svc-reporting That account was supposed to belong to an old reporting service. It had no reason to be coming from a normal employee workstation. So I checked the Security logs on the file server. Event ID 4624 showed a successful network logon. Logon Type: 3 The account was CORP\svc-reporting, and the source was WS-214. A few seconds later, Event ID 5140 showed the same account accessing: \\FS-08\Finance Now I wanted to know what happened on the workstation before that connection. The process logs showed PowerShell launching cmd.exe, and the command line included a net use connection to the Finance share using the service account. That was enough to treat it as possible lateral movement. I checked the account in Active Directory. Its description still said: Legacy reporting service The password had not been changed since February 2025. That told us something else. This was an old service credential that had been sitting around for a long time. We isolated WS-214, disabled the account, rotated the credentials and started checking every system that had used svc-reporting. We also reviewed the Finance share to see what had been accessed during the session. What stood out to me was that the attacker did not need some complicated exploit to move between systems. They had a valid credential. Windows accepted it. SMB accepted it. From the network’s point of view, the login looked legitimate. That is why stale service accounts can be dangerous. They normally run quietly for years, people forget who owns them, password rotation gets skipped, and eventually nobody is really watching where they are being used from. Sometimes lateral movement does not look like an exploit. It looks like a successful login from the wrong machine.

dfir横向移动windows @Officialwhyte22 source ↗

现成的载荷隐藏与加载手法,可用于免杀与检测规则验证

RT @ipurple: PngLoader - hides arbitrary data inside PNG images using two layers: 1⃣ Nibble-to-ASCII encoding - binary → printable ASCII characters 2⃣ Fibonacci steganography - encoded data → scattered pixels in a PNG 3⃣ Loader - a Windows "PNG viewer" that extracts and runs the hidden data https://t.co/KOK78v1npo

隐写loaderwindows工具 @0xocdsec source ↗

自建远控管理面本身就是高价值入口,需评估暴露面与鉴权

MeshCentral — A complete web-based remote monitoring and management web site. Once setup you can install agents and perform remote desktop session to devices on the local network or over the Internet. https://t.co/f69NvmVDH7 https://t.co/TBaRlv61Dl

工具自托管远程管理 @KitPloit source ↗

新开源 C2 框架落地后会快速进入实战与检测对抗,需提前掌握其能力边界。

reminder, blackmagick c2 release halloween night. full open source for https://t.co/zKV2rbHvmH pro users. i’ll explain how it all works, show how to extend it, and provide the tools to do so. livestream halloween night. hand out candy then get comfy and join the stream.

工具c2开源 @Teach2Breach source ↗

把 LLM 当恶意代码阅读器是低成本、可复现的样本分析路子

When I was getting started with malware - I praised Zeus and Carbanak (namely Carbanak) as teaching me a lot of what I knew. I remember spending days just reading through the source and reimplementing stuff to get in the head of the developer. I'm surprised I never decided to take a different look at it with an LLM. Well I know what I'll be doing this morning...

llm恶意软件逆向工具 @rad9800 source ↗

解锁后可得超出官方限制的显存与算力,直接影响本地跑大模型的门槛

RT @KBlueleaf: Now thanks to community resources like gpu-unlock-ada or gpu-unlock-4080s. I successfully unlocked my 4090 on "Windows" system. All the details are released in https://t.co/UOfas5elK9 Plz check it out! https://t.co/i4exHAkipR https://t.co/pbPAmvTGFW

固件绕过工具 @0xocdsec source ↗

RT @calysteon: CVE-2026-65373, CVE-2026-112511, CVE-2026-84496, CVE-2026-113946, CVE-2026-113941, CVE-2026-84498, CVE-2026-84590, CVE-2026-112482, CVE-2026-112457, CVE-2026-112443, CVE-2026-112708, CVE-2026-112461, CVE-2026-112417, CVE-2026-112481, CVE-2026-112451, CVE-2026-112622, CVE-2026-112529, CVE-2026-65384, CVE-2026-112526, CVE-2026-112620, CVE-2026-112671, CVE-2026-112519, CVE-2026-112414, CVE-2026-112604, CVE-2026-112546, CVE-2026-112413

cve @0xocdsec source ↗