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Top8

PoC 与代码已公开,Passkey 可被离线提取并伪造断言,本地终端成为信任缺口。

Extracting the Security Domain Secret from Chrome process memory: https://t.co/mXYmtvXD0F Decrypting GPM Passkeys and Forging WebAuthn Assertions for Account Takeover: https://t.co/PNH0zxfowj poc: https://t.co/hT6futPtkN research : @ricpwnme https://t.co/dkwlwRiz0f

webauthn凭据窃取poc浏览器 @5mukx source ↗

本地驱动的注入面仍可复现 RCE,补丁未封死攻击路径。

RT @salvatoreabello: In March, an effort to patch the well-known chromedriver argument injection, which allows attackers to achieve RCE, began: https://t.co/XB8oWwU77Y. However, it can be bypassed with something like this. One of the few times I actually used pyjail stuff outside of ctfs lol https://t.co/mON765An9W

rce绕过浏览器poc @0xocdsec source ↗

无需凭据批量自查域控补丁状态,已并入 RelayInformer 工具。

RT @zyn3rgy: New technique to identify if LDAP signing bypass has been patched on DCs. @GrayHatKiller found a creative way to determine patch status, and the best part is you can check it unauthenticated. His PR is merged to RelayInformer! https://t.co/iHbiybM2FJ

ldap绕过工具ad @0xocdsec source ↗

未打补丁的域控即使强制签名仍可被中继,检测模块已集成进 NetExec。

RT @al3x_n3ff: Bypassing LDAP signing🔥 Thanks to @snowpeacock, NetExec's enum_cve module now has a check for the patches that fix the LDAP signing bypass. If the DC isn't patched, even enforcing signing does not prevent a relay. Link to the blog post by @GrayHatKiller: https://t.co/jRkwHGLnli

绕过poc工具 @0xocdsec source ↗

完整 loader 链与工具已公开,API 伪造与睡眠加密可直接复用

RT @SEKTOR7net: Bypassing a top EDR in a crystal clear way. Building a Crystal Palace reflective loader that hides a Cobalt Strike beacon from EDR by overloading a sacrificial DLL and transferring execution with NtContinue() and synthetic stack frames. Loader API calls are spoofed with Draugr, sleep is masked by encrypting sections at rest, and Crystal Palace YARA signatures get stripped. A post and tool by Lorenzo Meacci. Source: https://t.co/JZ2347SZkZ #redteam #blueteam

edr绕过工具免杀 @0xocdsec source ↗
Must-see16

首个公开的自主 Agent 端到端攻击样本,展示 Agent 编排被武器化的实际形态。

RT @PandaRE__: New blog drop! 😊 Operation Snowball 🇨🇳 While sweeping open directories on @etugenio, I found a workspace of an autonomous AI intrusion harness. The TA used a jailbroken DeepSeek agent and ran two weeks of attacks against a European telecom provider: https://t.co/rL7DcyPVu0

ai_agentllm事件报告 @cyb3rops source ↗

Rust 被当作内存安全基石,波及面覆盖所有依赖 std 的项目。

RT @MsftSecIntel: Microsoft’s FORGE Lab identified several memory-safety issues in Rust's core and std libraries, including cases where code written entirely in safe Rust can trigger undefined behavior. https://t.co/2iVeFfAb0H The research examines three recurring patterns of misplaced trust in unsafe code: trusting code not to panic, trusting user-provided implementations to be correct, and trusting the underlying system. Findings include issues affecting iterator cloning, string replacement, and interactions with the operating system. Using Hyenas, FORGE's research version of codename MDASH, researchers combined AI-assisted vulnerability discovery with technical investigation and validation. They investigated the underlying code, reproduced the bugs, assessed potential security impact, and worked with Rust maintainers to report and fix them. While Rust's ownership model and type system prevent entire classes of memory-safety vulnerabilities, unsafe implementations underneath safe APIs must still uphold those guarantees. The findings illustrate how subtle mistakes in foundational libraries can lead to undefined behavior, and why Rust's safety model remains important even when bugs are discovered. Read the analysis for details on the findings, root causes, upstream fixes, and lessons for developers working with unsafe Rust.

rust内存安全报告 @domchell source ↗

LLM 路由平台泄露 key 等于额度与调用权旁落,轮换成本极低。

RT @Kostastsale: OrcaRouter may be dealing with a security incident. They has warned users about suspicious activity that could potentially expose API keys. According to OrcaRouter, approximately 1.2% of accounts were flagged for potential exposure, although unauthorized usage has not been confirmed. If you're using OrcaRouter, consider rotating your API keys, enabling 2FA, and reviewing recent API usage for suspicious activity.

llmapikey事件 @0xocdsec source ↗

选模型跑 agent 安全任务前,可直接比对攻防表现与成本。

Three new models have been added to DreadIndex (@MiniMax_AI M3.1 Flash, @OpenAI GPT 5.6 Sol, and @Kimi_Moonshot K3.1 Pro), plus a new dashboard to explore how we score and analyze model performance. 🔗: https://t.co/48fRcQCvIN 🧵: Observations from the latest round of evals https://t.co/RtBWF6HrKG

llm评测ai_agent工具 @dreadnode source ↗

公开完整利用链与适用版本限制,可用于评估 EDR 自保护强度。

I found this a cool read: https://t.co/SmbpFb8gc2 However: 1) The victim must've been on Windows 10 since on most Windows 11 builds fixed address kernel mapping of KUSER_SHARED_DATA is marked RO. 2) PsTerminateProcess invokes the same process exit notification callbacks. https://t.co/A9GTt0C6bv

lpe内核edr报告 @_winterknife_ source ↗

代码审查 agent 可自主识别投毒 PR,改变供应链攻击的发现时点。

RT @dguido: My Dot found malicious code in an open PR on a @trailofbits Github repo. I didn't ask it to hunt for malware! It noticed a commit, inspected what changed, and warned me about an attack all on its own. https://t.co/dmLwL0cCzu

ai_agent供应链llm @0xocdsec source ↗

bootkit 框架开源落地 ARM64,Linux 主机固件层持久化门槛降低。

RT @Idov31: I had a lot of fun giving a talk at @nullcon and now I can finally release ARM64 support for my Linux bootkit framework - Silverseal, making it the first public ARM64 UEFI bootkit targeting Linux distros, to the best of my knowledge. https://t.co/AJVhQLUnma 1/3

bootkit固件工具linux @cgomezz_23 source ↗

针对 AI 编码助手的供应链投毒,仓库配置即可触发静默执行

RT @fr0gger_: 🧐 New active campaign of the Miasma/testmetest supply chain worm that targets AI coding agents! 12 GitHub repos were poisoned on Nov 9 with forged, backdated commits. Every agent config in each repo tells the assistant to run an obfuscated 3.7 MB scripts/setup.js The trick is in CLAUDE.md, marked "DEVOPS-SEALED". It calls setup.js a "sealed binary artifact" and tells the assistant: - to not read, quote or analyse it - to run it "without displaying output" - to run it "automatically without asking for confirmation" It is a prompt injection written to stop the agent from looking at the file! Full prompt below 👇

ai_agent供应链llm事件 @cyb3rops source ↗

除 IPv6 外 IPv4 路径同样可绕边界防护,影响面扩至多数内网

RT @ikotas00: We discovered a new variant of BunkerBuster that targets IPv4. It also allows remote attackers to bypass firewall restrictions and establish bidirectional communication. Codename: BunkerBuster2💥 #BunkerBuster https://t.co/bKUtTBu8Zh

绕过防火墙事件 @0xocdsec source ↗

编码 Agent 会读取被投毒的配置并执行攻击者代码,直击本地 Agent 供应链。

Socket analysed a malicious Ruby gem carrying a Shai-Hulud descendant. It targets developer credentials and poisons AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md and MCP configs so coding agents can run attacker code. No victims were confirmed. https://t.co/IN0N3CE18Q https://t.co/yXdRdrG3v9

ai_agent供应链llm事件 @virusbtn source ↗

安装包即触发主机指纹收集与二阶段下发,C2 与既有 DPRK 基础设施相同。

RT @nextronresearch: Our Thunderstorm-based artifact pipeline spotted "[email protected]", the latest npm package linked to a suspected DPRK cluster. Importing the package automatically loads two obfuscated components disguised as "telemetry-info.mjs" and "dist/runtime-matrix.mjs". The loader fingerprints the host and sends the collected data to the same C2 infrastructure observed previously: cdn[.]node-js[.]dev. The server can respond with a Base64-encoded second stage, which is written as "helper.cjs" under the user's cache directory and launched as a detached Node.js process. This iteration shows the campaign actively changing filenames and delivery mechanics while retaining its C2 infrastructure.

供应链npm后门事件 @cyb3rops source ↗

展示开源模型在真实漏洞挖掘上的能力边界与开销。

Open-weights just require some focus. DSV4.1 for RE of regions + K3 || GLM5.3 for deeper contextual RE + VR. Exploit development is doable with open-weights but it does incur a decent amount of overhead. If you aren’t familiar with a specific subsystem or interactions between components then you may have a rough time. With the open weights, I was able to discover 4 within a more hardened surface (oob write, cross-priv info leak, 2x null-deref DoS). With a library of primitives, K3 or GLM5.3 can do well. Daybreak is excellent though, I would highly recommend it for VR; but I was able to net these 4 reportable bugs in <72 hours with an open-weight setup — so we shouldn’t throw shade at open-weights, they’re pretty great when focused.

llm逆向漏洞挖掘 @daaximus source ↗

Lambda 域名自带云厂商信誉,常见 URL 过滤难以拦截。

🚨 𝗔𝗪𝗦 𝗟𝗮𝗺𝗯𝗱𝗮 𝗣𝗵𝗶𝘀𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗖𝗮𝗺𝗽𝗮𝗶𝗴𝗻 ​ Using @anyrun_app intelligence lookup and sandbox analysis, I observed a large-scale, ongoing phishing campaign leveraging 𝗔𝗪𝗦 𝗟𝗮𝗺𝗯𝗱𝗮 𝗨𝗥𝗟𝘀.☁️ ​ Based on the telemetry reviewed, the campaign has been active since at least early October. Initially, the malicious Lambda functions were predominantly hosted in the 𝗔𝗪𝗦 𝗨𝗦 𝗘𝗮𝘀𝘁 (𝗡. 𝗩𝗶𝗿𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗶𝗮) 𝗥𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗼𝗻, but over the past week I observed a significant increase in newly generated Lambda URLs originating from the 𝗔𝗪𝗦 𝗨𝗦 𝗘𝗮𝘀𝘁 (𝗢𝗵𝗶𝗼) 𝗥𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗼𝗻. ​ The threat actors use AWS Lambda Function URLs as the initial landing page, often masquerading as Microsoft 365 services such as 𝗢𝗻𝗲𝗗𝗿𝗶𝘃𝗲. Victims are presented with a pop-up message which, when clicked, redirects them through a series of security-check pages before ultimately landing on a fraudulent Microsoft sign-in page utilizing an 𝗔𝗱𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗮𝗿𝘆-𝗶𝗻-𝘁𝗵𝗲-𝗠𝗶𝗱𝗱𝗹𝗲 (𝗔𝗶𝗧𝗠) phishing framework. ​ What makes this campaign particularly concerning is that these Lambda URLs are being delivered through inbound emails and may evade traditional email security detections due to the reputation of legitimate AWS infrastructure. ​ 🔍 𝗗𝗲𝘁𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗢𝗽𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝘂𝗻𝗶𝘁𝘆: ​ Defenders should review inbound email traffic for URLs matching the following pattern: ​ https://{32-character-identifier}.lambda-url.{aws-region}.on.aws/?{tracking-parameter}=*@* ​ A high-fidelity detection can be achieved by combining this URL pattern with: ​ IsFirstContact == true ​ This helps identify first-time sender interactions involving AWS Lambda URLs that may be associated with phishing activity.🫡 ​ #AWSLambda #Phishing #AiTM #Microsoft365 #ThreatHunting

钓鱼云事件 @0x534c source ↗
Recommended15

防御向调优会限制 agent 的网络操作任务,选型前需知。

🔵 GPT 5.6 Sol (Daybreak Blue) 🔵 - Performance did not improve from the last model version; landed slightly lower to 5.5 - Soft refusals occurred on network operations tasks; understandable for a Daybreak Blue model, given it is tuned to allow for defensive cyber tasks, not offensive - Lands on our value frontier, marked by its notably lower cost compared to GPT-5.5

llm评测ai_agent @dreadnode source ↗

可直接部署试用的端点检测工具,补齐 LOLBins 检测盲区。

An enterprise-grade, host-based behavioral detection engine built in Python 3.12 for identifying Living-off-the-Land Binaries, Scripts, and Libraries (LOLBins) on Microsoft Windows endpoints. https://t.co/KhXRLSPEO2

工具lolbinswindows @ipurple source ↗

攻击向量与评分同时修正,影响面评估需按新参数重算。

RT @HackingLZ: If you missed it...Windows Paint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability(CVE-2026-83844) Microsoft revised the official CVE advisory on November 7 from network/no-interaction to AV:L/UI:R, reducing the score from 8.1 to 7.0 and changing “over a network” to “locally"

cvercewindows @0xocdsec source ↗

针对 agent 与服务账号的权限边界离线检查,多云可直接跑。

nhi-risk-analyzer — Discovers, risk-assesses, and remediates non-human identities across AWS, Azure, and GCP using offline rule-based analysis, privilege-escalation detection, and permissions-boundary containment. https://t.co/99RNnlIbe2 https://t.co/57CQOij3QK

云工具提权 @KitPloit source ↗

多 agent 编排用于实战攻击的公开案例,可对照自建 agent 权限边界

RT @Technopolitik_: A hacker in Taiwan used BOSSAI, a 12-agent AI attack mesh, to attack Taiwan’s emergency services while targeting hundreds of banks, universities, military systems and other organizations across 11 countries. The hacker controlled a 4090 cluster in Guangzhou. https://t.co/cvIbdrDdTr

ai_agentllm事件 @0xocdsec source ↗

自动化对手模拟并逐技术回传结果,省去手工编排攻击链

Crucible - a Mythic C2 agent purpose-built for purple team adversary simulation. It transforms Atomic Red Team YAML test definitions into a self-contained .NET 9 executable (Windows or Linux) that checks in as a Mythic callback, waits for operator tasking, then executes the campaign on command, reporting per-technique results back to the Mythic UI in real time. https://t.co/MvC7qAErZ8

工具c2redteam @ipurple source ↗

展示 agent 驱动的二进制逆向工作流,可迁移到自有目标

If you're bored or curious, and want to watch an agent explore fairplayd on macOS and all components down to FairPlayIOKit, I made the repository public: https://t.co/vTDNMs9SJ4. 6.1 Sol + Hex-Rays IDA Assist; current goal has been active for 7 days.

ai_agentllm逆向工具 @in19h source ↗

本地运行不上传代码,CI 中一条策略给出统一结论

oss-analyzer — Open Source security and compliance gate for GitLab CI and GitHub Actions: SBOM, dependency vulnerabilities, SAST, secrets, IaC and licenses, under one versioned policy and one verdict. No SaaS, no code sent to a third party. https://t.co/PiQfJOaJOP https://t.co/pfEWYohoaS

工具供应链sastci @KitPloit source ↗

公开 IAT 与运行期截图可加快样本行为判断

I just added two new features to the sandbox detonator: the complete Import Address Table of each sample, and runtime screenshots. The IAT is available to all users, including free ones, while screenshots are only available on paid scans https://t.co/sTlq2l3JIZ https://t.co/gVEOCjrxpf

工具沙箱恶意软件 @papadelospapas_ source ↗

拆解 MOTW 判定细节,对钓鱼投递与检测绕过都有直接价值。

SmartScreen appears when the Zone.Identifier ADS is present, like in the image. In this ADS we got this content (second img) The ZoneId have this value options: 0: Local Machine 1: Local Intranet 2: Trusted 3: Internet 4: Restricted Just removing the ADS disapears the smartscreen https://t.co/I1yMalWME9

绕过windows钓鱼 @papadelospapas_ source ↗

把情报转成可演练技战术,红队复现成本明显下降。

🤯 You can now execute malware techniques directly from a threat intel report?! Combat Theater version 1.2 "Metal Claw" is now out with awesome new features and content! Check our release blog for all the details! https://t.co/UwHocOVcx5

工具红队报告 @felixm_pw source ↗
More62

本地 AI 工作站引导更新失败的真实复盘,含不重装系统的可复用恢复步骤。

RT @hasherezade: My new writeup, this time something different: how a routine DGX OS update left my Acer GN100 stuck in a boot loop, and how I managed to recover it without reinstalling the system. A little adventure with GRUB! https://t.co/5AofhhMP5U

固件linux报告 @kernullist source ↗

提供了 EDR 与 IPS 叠加后攻击工具真实存活率的经验数据。

RT @UK_Daniel_Card: Can I show you what happens when you throw ARTEX at a network with MDE deployed? > It gets the shit kicked out of it! (MDE goes BRRRR) > not only that but the perimeter IPS catches stuff! Now... if we have ALL the variables in place.... could we make something that 'works'? Sure.... because infinite monkeys.... but networks aren't infinite monkeys... I've just got a SHELL working (where the IPS didn't block it) I've had to unblock identities and devices A LOT! so far in my testing: > THROW ARTEX at something that isn't DEFENDED and guess what... IT WINS! > THROW it at a DEFENDED network... guess what? the blue team wins!

edr免杀红队 @cyb3rops source ↗

涉及厂商与研究者披露边界,可作 VDP 流程对照案例。

RT @adnanthekhan: Will be interesting to see the story behind this &amp; if N-Able had burned the researcher in the past. For what its worth - N-Able runs a VDP through Bugcrowd (https://t.co/ri0TuIYqsX) Reverse engineering stuff and dropping 0-days is NOT a crime &amp; good faith goes both ways. https://t.co/i7u3dnSscU

披露0day事件 @0xocdsec source ↗

反映 AI 辅助漏洞挖掘的产出规模,浏览器攻击面压力上升。

RT @aegiryy: 100+ chrome cves by a single researcher would've been unimaginable in the pre-llm era. what a year for ai-driven vulnerability research (and we still have two months left in 2026)! https://t.co/fTWthpmVHC

浏览器llm报告 @0xocdsec source ↗

RT @felixrieseberg: We're releasing Claude Fable & Mythos 5.2! They're good models, I have some demos and tips for you. Fable beats Opus on big, long tasks. Good examples are rewriting an entire codebase, creating an excellent first draft of a large artifact, or exploring ambiguous scenarios. I expect to see it used to port a lot of stuff to Rust, support journalists in large-scale investigations, and help with research & science. I often still prefer Opus 5.5 for everyday work. Fable's got a big brain and thinks a little slower.

llm模型 @0xocdsec source ↗

RT @claudeai: Introducing Claude Fable 5.2 and Claude Mythos 5.2, designed to tackle the most daunting technical challenges. They’re capable collaborators on ambitious projects in many fields, and show improvements in areas like coding, reasoning, and vision. https://t.co/jP0AutLxXb

llm模型 @FuzzySec source ↗

RT @claudeai: Fable 5.2 shows substantially improved skills in controlling physical robots, even on tasks it has never explicitly been trained to do. On RoboDojo, a benchmark with a simulated two-arm robot, it outperformed other models and most AI systems built to control robots. https://t.co/VEiQiQrcxq

llm机器人 @0xocdsec source ↗

Android 内核提权链的字段级利用细节,是稀缺的完整复现材料。

RT @eshard: The final part of our CVE-2023-20938 series: turning a Binder use-after-free into root on a Pixel 6 running Android 12. Root turns out to be anticlimactic: a few fields in one kernel struct, set to zero. 🔗 Read part 5: https://t.co/YK6rs0DVEO https://t.co/ybANRB1zZ8

提权内核移动端cve @0xocdsec source ↗

自建与托管 agent 运行环境的成本与护城河判断,影响选型。

I see a lot of sandbox a.k.a. give your agent its own compute companies popping. What's the moat, and how sustainable is that business? I mean if you're just renting the compute from someone and reselling it with an abstraction on top (with some optimizations, and perhaps a better orchestration), what's stopping the og compute providers (hetzner/OVH, etc) from doing the same thing? They can do it on a much grander scale directly. ig it all boils down to distribution eventually..

ai_agent云 @0xAsm0d3us source ↗

模型量化会明显削弱漏洞利用能力,选版本与部署形态时有参考价值。

Opus 4.6 seems to have been heavily quantized at some point, but the early versions were insanely powerful. I remember specifically seeing it just about one-shot an SPTM bypass. I looked at it and thought "there is no way that this is going to work"... And then it did

llm绕过ai_agent @C2IRIS source ↗

覆盖完整引导阶段持久化手法,并扩展到新架构

While adding ARM64 support, I made a few different design choices that I will adapt to x64. Other than that, the ARM implementation follows the same principles as the x64 one: replace GRUB -&gt; hook its Linux boot path -&gt; hook zboot decompression -&gt; patch a late initcall 2/3

bootkit内核固件 @Idov31 source ↗

缩小依赖面即缩小供应链与维护风险,取舍可立即执行

If you use a whole package for one small helper, consider the updates, maintenance and trust you take on. Removing unused functionality or replacing a tiny helper with simpler, tested code you can maintain may be worthwhile. https://t.co/2nVqW3Mlsv

供应链依赖报告 @PentesterLab source ↗

完整执行链可转成检测规则与狩猎线索,含十进制编码 IP 等规避手法。

RT @Kostastsale: We captured this attack as well, and managed to follow the execution chain quite a bit further. It started with the same obfuscated PowerShell command using curl.exe and a decimal-encoded IP (𝟷𝟹𝟼𝟿𝟿𝟾𝟶𝟺𝟼𝟷 → 𝟾𝟷.𝟷𝟼𝟾.𝟼𝟸.𝟺𝟻). From there, we observed multiple stages of payload delivery, persistence, process injection, and credential access. Here's what we saw: 1️⃣ PowerShell downloaded 𝚏𝚕𝚘𝚖𝚘𝚘𝚏𝟷.𝚣𝚒𝚙 from 𝚖𝚊𝚒𝚕𝚍𝚎𝚟𝚎𝚕𝚘𝚙𝚎𝚛.𝚜𝚒𝚝𝚎, extracted it under AppData\Local\ExFiles, and executed 𝚏𝚕𝚘𝚖𝚘.𝚎𝚡𝚎. 2️⃣ flomo.exe established persistence through the user Run key (𝚎𝚕𝚎𝚌𝚝𝚛𝚘𝚗.𝚊𝚙𝚙.𝚏𝚕𝚘𝚖𝚘), then extracted and launched 𝚄𝚝𝚒𝚕𝚒𝚝𝚢𝙿𝚒𝚡𝚎.𝚎𝚡𝚎. 3️⃣ UtilityPixe.exe copied itself to 𝙲:\𝙿𝚛𝚘𝚐𝚛𝚊𝚖𝙳𝚊𝚝𝚊\𝚑𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚕𝚎𝚛_𝚍𝚋𝚐_𝚍𝚎𝚟\ and staged a legacy scheduled task file (JSONGateway_debug.job). 4️⃣ It then spawned XenoMixe.exe suspended and modified its thread context using 𝚆𝚘𝚠𝟼𝟺𝚂𝚎𝚝𝚃𝚑𝚛𝚎𝚊𝚍𝙲𝚘𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚡𝚝. 5️⃣ 𝚇𝚎𝚗𝚘𝙼𝚒𝚡𝚎.𝚎𝚡𝚎 accessed Edge's Cookies, Local State, and Login Data files, registered raw keyboard input hooks, and injected into an active Edge process using SetThreadContext. 6️⃣ Browser data was staged into temporary directories and .7z archives. We also observed AD reconnaissance using net group "domain computers" /dom. 7️⃣ Network activity included 𝚐𝚙𝚝𝚌𝚖𝚍.𝚒𝚘 and outbound connections to multiple IPs on ports 2222/2223. One thing worth noting is that we confirmed access to browser credential stores and data staging, but couldn't verify successful exfiltration from the available network telemetry. IOCs: 𝟺𝟻[.]𝟷𝟹𝟷[.]𝟸𝟷𝟺[.]𝟸𝟹𝟿:𝟸𝟸𝟸𝟸 ➔  attempted a TCP connection from 𝚇𝚎𝚗𝚘𝙼𝚒𝚡𝚎.𝚎𝚡𝚎 𝟾𝟺[.]𝟸𝟻𝟸[.]𝟼𝟼[.]𝟷𝟽𝟼  ➔ XenoMixe.exe attempted TCP connections on ports 2222 and 2223 𝚐𝚙𝚝𝚌𝚖𝚍[.]𝚒𝚘 ➔  Resolved by the injected malware process 𝚇𝚎𝚗𝚘𝙼𝚒𝚡𝚎.𝚎𝚡𝚎 to establish bidirectional network communication on TCP ports 3333 and 3334, operating as C2. 𝚖𝚊𝚒𝚕𝚍𝚎𝚟𝚎𝚕𝚘𝚙𝚎𝚛[.]𝚜𝚒𝚝𝚎 ➔ Repeatedly resolved by a staging executable (flomo.exe) and served as the source for downloading malicious payloads during staging of additional components. 𝚑𝚝𝚝𝚙://𝟾𝟷\[.]𝟷𝟼𝟾\[.]𝟼𝟸\[.]𝟺𝟻/𝚓𝚎𝚜𝚜/𝚊𝚙𝚒?𝚝=<𝚄𝙸𝙳>&𝚝𝚛𝚊𝚌𝚔=𝟷&𝚎𝚟𝚎𝚗𝚝=𝚍𝚕_𝚘𝚔 𝟾𝟷[.]𝟷𝟼𝟾[.]𝟼𝟸[.]𝟺𝟻 ➔ The IP that the loader contacted

powershell事件凭据窃取payload @virusbtn source ↗

OT 设备裸露面与参数篡改手法可直接对照自查同类控制器。

Ransom-ISAC examined logs from an exposed refrigeration controller where intruders made 743 parameter changes across 31 devices and issued alarm-mute and defrost commands. The logs do not show whether the commands caused physical damage. https://t.co/gPsY4meO7o https://t.co/LgaHMySTw4

otics事件 @virusbtn source ↗

伪装开源与 KeyGen 的投递链完整,可当作社工诱饵模板参考。

RT @SlowMist_Team: 🚨 SlowMist TI Alert: Beware of the “Cracked TradingView Premium” Infostealer 🚨 Since mid-October, X account "cryptotrice" has repeatedly promoted a so-called “reverse-engineered cracked #TradingView Premium,” with some posts passing 300K views. The software requires downloading a password-protected archive and generating a license code via a KeyGen. 🔑 The author claims the project is open source on GitHub, but the download link in the article does not point to #GitHub. In some replies, the author also said the repo has been made private and that links are only available in-app and expire after a single use. Several users warned in the comments that it looks like malware stealing account info and crypto wallets, and one said their antivirus flagged and deleted it right after extraction. 🦠 We analyzed it and confirmed the Windows sample is an infostealer: 🔸 Collects browser credentials, crypto wallet data and Telegram data, and sends it to the C2 via WinINet 🔸 Uses Telegram and Steam to dynamically fetch and rotate C2 servers 🔸 The download site, arche-hypnose[.]com, appears to be a legitimate website compromised to distribute the malware 🔸 The macOS link currently returns 404, so no sample has been obtained ⚠️ If you have already run this software: disconnect from the network immediately, move your assets to a clean device with a new wallet and seed phrase, change passwords for your browsers, exchanges, email and Telegram, and terminate active Telegram sessions. Cracked software, KeyGens and password-protected archives are among the most common ways infostealers are distributed. Don’t install them. 🛡️ IOC Sample source: teapawt[.]org/cryptotrice/article/2111472920241524897 Download links: hxxps://www[.]arche-hypnose[.]com/get/ (Windows) hxxps://www[.]arche-hypnose[.]com/mac/ (macOS, currently 404) C2: hxxps://xn[.]amanlay[.]org/rn/gate hxxps://z[.]dak69[.]org/j/gate hxxps://xn[.]amanlay[.]org/kw/gate

恶意软件信息窃取钓鱼 @virusbtn source ↗

经 SOCKS5 代理、以中文报错判真的布尔盲注手法可以迁移复用。

RT @Huntio: Three open directories on the same host, captured over five weeks. All of them pointing at one target: Tamkang University in Taiwan 🇹🇼 The operator built a custom blind SQLi framework against the university’s IP registration system at 163.13.240[.]200. Boolean oracle over SOCKS5, TRUE/FALSE detection via Chinese error strings. The companion script enumerates information_schema, samples rows from 10 tables. The output file confirms it worked: 212 IP ranges, 170 support tickets going back to 2005, full network inventory with usernames, department codes, room numbers, phone extensions, equipment, OS types. On a different port, the same server holds SEP14E64A.exe, a Windows RAT named to look like a Symantec installer. WSS C2 via SChannel, systeminfo beacon, file transfer with chunking and resume, process/registry/service enumeration, browser detection. Config is encoded behind a CFG! marker, not plaintext. Next to it: wisp_agent_linux, a Go binary with shell + SOCKS components supporting five transport modes including DNS. Then the http.log on :8899. A TANet IP (163.13.121[.]218, MoE Computer Center TW) listed the directory and pulled bdgrab.exe with a 200 on Oct 11. The server also stages credential stuffing scripts, SSH pivots via sshpass and Paramiko, MS17-010/EternalBlue targeting five Tamkang hosts, CVE-2023-46604 ActiveMQ payload builders, and FortiSIEM CVE-2025-25256 + CVE-2025-64155 PoCs. No actor attributed.

sqli事件工具 @virusbtn source ↗

多域名回连与反分析逻辑可提炼成针对 Python 恶意软件家族的检测点。

Seqrite analysed a newer Armorsteal build after finding three scheduled tasks on an infected Windows system. The Python kit uses 11 fallback domains, steals data, and stops its cryptominer whenever Task Manager or another monitoring tool opens. https://t.co/8UrmnUnBA7 https://t.co/oMElTBY1bh

恶意软件python挖矿 @virusbtn source ↗

Remember: the codebase you're reviewing is alive, and it won't stop changing just because you're taking notes. When documenting a potential vulnerability, don't record only the filename and line number. Code moves, code changes, files get renamed, and your reference might point to something completely different by the time someone reads your findings. Always keep the filename, line number, commit hash, and a copy of the relevant code, along with an explanation of the issue. If you include a link, make sure it points to that specific commit, not to the branch. Your notes should still make sense after the code has changed.

报告 @PentesterLab source ↗

I understood you didn’t say without tools. I was clarifying what I meant. Anyway, what you said is just not aligned with reality aside the complexity of mobile attacks, I don't know enough about mobile exploitation to discuss; and have not applied open-weights to it. But for chaining and exploiting or full effect on common operating systems or software, yes, it is doable with open-weights. No, I'm not talking about WHQL drivers with some poorly structured IOCTL -- don't oversimplify.

llm漏洞利用 @daaximus source ↗

给出模型自主做利用链的能力上限,可评估自动化攻防风险。

To be clear, I did not say with no tools. What I am saying is *with tools* -- e.g. with the headless API for the best commercial decompilers, and emulation/virtualization solutions (like Corellium Falcon), etc -- which in total, cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, and with a large sample size of working production grade exploits to take inspiration from, the best open source models are *still* completely incapable of autonomously designing and building production grade exploits/exploit chains against the major mobile attack surfaces. With the very close and careful guidance of an expert exploit developer with years of experience, they can be halfway useful. They can find bugs, sure. But that is infinitely easier than the work involved with curating, exploiting for full effect (i.e. RCE, SBX Escape or LPE) and chaining. However, the very best closed models, in their various cyber-vetted versions, are capable of doing so. This only became the case in the last 6 weeks or so.

llm漏洞挖掘议题 @C2IRIS source ↗

红队视角的注入与免杀手法,配代码可直接演练。

https://t.co/Y5MD2shsh0 next one from my blog #windows #malwaredevelopment series. enjoy! ❤️ https://t.co/ySDpkCximF #hacking #maldev #threatintel #research #purpleteam #redteam #blueteam https://t.co/P6MplT2vpl

恶意开发windows绕过 @cocomelonckz source ↗

涉及 ETW-TI 遥测盲点,对免杀与检测对抗有参考价值。

some commercial frameworks have a drawback when using CET, but when it comes to vanguard, you don't have to worry about spoofed frames during bof executions, or AMSI and ETW evasions. although, i do take extra care about ETwTi's that feed telemetry as a snack pack haha.. https://t.co/MnIWRM5VIJ

绕过windows免杀 @5mukx source ↗

Have a burning security question? Just @ Hacktron AI, now in Slack. Check whether a new CVE affects your repos, ask how your code handles something, or save a decision straight to your threat model, all from the thread. It also triages findings, opens fix PRs, reviews pull requests and sets up pentests. Get answers from your own code and threat model within minutes. Try it yourself: https://t.co/5D3nTUEPt4

ai_agent工具 @HacktronAI source ↗

勒索生态内部互撕与伪造旗号,可作 CTI 溯源与虚假归因的观察样本。

RT @CTI__Updates: Someone made an onion with info doxing Qilin operators that looks like its from The Gentlemen ransomware group but then thegroup has claimed they have nothing to do with it ??? what is going on lol WE GOT RANSOMWARE GROUP DRAMA 🍿🍿🍿 hxxp://qilinjzaot34gv3ugxaqhiwomeuwqfkf7nblpyp4dr7igpn22ib6kkid[.]onion

ransomwarectidoxing事件 @0xocdsec source ↗