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无需交互的 PHP 远程代码执行,受影响产品线广,官方已发布修复版本

Cisco Security Advisory Vulnerabilities in PHP Affecting Cisco Products: October 2026 Critical Advisory ID: cisco-sa-php-october26-Jj384Daq First Published: 2026 October 21 19:12 GMT Version 1.0: Interim Workarounds: No workarounds available Email Summary On October 21, the PHP Foundation announced the availability of a Critical PHP Security release addressing two critical vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-109618 - RCE via OOM corruption CVE-2026-109619 - RCE via stale global state For information about these vulnerabilities, see the advisories GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w and GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp . These vulnerabilities are being referenced as PHP2shell. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-php-october26-Jj384Daq Affected Products Cisco is investigating its product line to determine which products and cloud services may be affected by these vulnerabilities. As the investigation progresses, Cisco will update this advisory with information about affected products and services. The Vulnerable Products section will include Cisco bug IDs for each affected product or service. The bugs are accessible through the Cisco Bug Search Tool and contain additional platform-specific information, including workarounds (if available) and fixed software releases. Products Under Investigation The following products are under active investigation to determine whether they are affected by the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory. Network and Content Security Devices Cisco AI Defense (hybrid on-premises deployment) Cisco Hypershield Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) Network Management and Provisioning Cisco Business Process Automation (BPA) Cisco Catalyst Center (formerly DNA Center) Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager Cisco Nexus Dashboard Insights Cisco WAN Automation Engine (WAE) Routing and Switching - Service Provider Cisco ASR 5000 Series Software (StarOS) Cisco Policy Suite (CPS) Cisco Ultra Cloud Core - Converged Policy and Charging Cisco Ultra Cloud Core - Policy Control Function Cisco Ultra Cloud Core - Subscriber Microservices Infrastructure Voice and Unified Communications Devices Cisco Expressway Series Wireless Cisco Ultra-Reliable Wireless Backhaul (URWB) Cisco Unified Industrial Wireless Software Application Observability AppDynamics On-Premises Secure Application AppDynamics PHP Agent Cisco Cloud Hosted Services AppDynamics SaaS Secure Application Cisco CX Cloud Cisco Defense Orchestrator Cisco IoT Control Center Cisco Multicloud Defense Cisco Panoptica Cisco Secure Access Cisco Secure Email Threat Defense Cisco Umbrella Cisco Vulnerability Management (formerly Kenna.VM) Cisco+ Secure Connect Slido Webex Vulnerable Products Cisco is investigating its product line to determine which products may be affected by these vulnerabilities and the impact on each affected product. Currently, no products are known to be affected. This section will be updated as information is available. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable Cisco is investigating its product line to determine which products may be affected by these vulnerabilities. This section will be updated as information becomes available. Workarounds There are no workarounds that address these vulnerabilities. Exploitation and Public Announcements The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) is aware that a public announcement is available for the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory. The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any malicious use of the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory. Source These vulnerabilities were disclosed by the PHP Foundation. Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy To learn about Cisco security vulnerability disclosure policies and publications, see the Security Vulnerability Policy . This document also contains instructions for obtaining fixed software and receiving security vulnerability information from Cisco. For additional information on Cisco's vulnerability management, disclosure cadence, and software patching strategy, see Cisco's Transition to a Risk-Based Vulnerability Disclosure Model . Subscribe to Cisco Security Notifications Subscribe Action Links for This Advisory Snort Rule 67359 Snort Rule 67360 URL https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-php-october26-Jj384Daq Revision History Version Description Section Status Date 1.0 Initial public release. - Interim 2026-OCT-21 Show Less Legal Disclaimer SOFTWARE DOWNLOADS AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT The Cisco Support and Downloads page on Cisco.com provides information about licensing and downloads. This page can also display customer device support coverage for customers who use the My Devices tool. Please note that customers may download only software that was procured from Cisco directly or through a Cisco authorized reseller or partner and for which the license is still valid. Customers who purchase directly from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who make purchases through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should obtain upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) . Customers should have the product serial number available and be prepared to provide the URL of this advisory as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. When considering software upgrades , customers are advised to regularly consult the advisories for the relevant Cisco products to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, customers are advised to contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted maintenance providers. LEGAL DISCLAIMER DETAILS CISCO DOES NOT MAKE ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED GUARANTEES OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. WITHOUT LIMITING THE GENERALITY OF THE FOREGOING, CISCO DOES NOT GUARANTEE THE ACCURACY OR COMPLETENESS OF THIS INFORMATION. THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. Copies or summaries of the information contained in this Security Advisory may lack important information or contain factual errors. Customers are advised to visit the Cisco Security Advisories page for the most recent version of this Security Advisory. The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) assesses only the affected and fixed release information that is documented in this advisory. See the Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy for more information. Feedback Leave additional feedback Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy To learn about Cisco security vulnerability disclosure policies and publications, see the Security Vulnerability Policy . This document also contains instructions for obtaining fixed software and receiving security vulnerability information from Cisco. For additional information on Cisco's vulnerability management, disclosure cadence, and software patching strategy, see Cisco's Transition to a Risk-Based Vulnerability Disclosure Model . Subscribe to Cisco Security Notifications Subscribe Action Links for This Advisory Snort Rule 67359 Snort Rule 67360

rcecvephp @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗

未认证远程直达 root,常暴露在边界的协作网关须优先排查。

A vulnerability in the database service feature of Cisco Expressway Series could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker with network access to a Cisco Expressway device to execute arbitrary operating system commands as root . This vulnerability is due to the use of persistent cookies. Additionally, there is insufficient validation of client certificates when the TLS Verify Mode is set to Enabled for clustering, which means that client certificates are not validated. An attacker with possession of the cookies could exploit this vulnerability by connecting to the database service and invoking specific remote procedure call (RPC) commands. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands as root on the underlying operating system of an affected device. Note: Cisco Expressway Series refers to Cisco Expressway Core (Expressway-C) devices and Cisco Expressway Edge (Expressway-E) devices. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-vcs-static-cred-hr7EWZ8t This advisory is part of a group of advisories. For a complete list of the advisories and links to them, see Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of October 21, 2026, Security Advisories . In addition, for further documentation of improvements and fixes in Cisco Expressway Series see Cisco Expressway Series Security Hardening Release: October 2026 . <br/>Security Impact Rating: Critical <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-76466

rce未认证证书校验边界设备 @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗

PHP 部署面极广,核心内存破坏可导致远端代码执行,需尽快核对版本。

PSIRT PHP core RCE vulnerability patches (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) Summary CVE-2026-109618 PHP uses longjmp() for out-of-memory (OOM) errors to exit the current context and abort handling of the request. Some contexts may not properly account for this scenario and leave request memory in an uninitialized state before performing an allocation. The subsequent request cleanup procedure may read or branch on this memory. Multiple OOM strategies can consistently trigger this condition and lead to remote code execution (RCE). Fortinet is currently investigating the impact of this CVE over Fortinet Products. Products Under Investigation FortiADC FortiADC Manager FortiClient EMS FortiDDoS FortiDDoS-F FortiSIEM FortiMonitor FortiClient Cloud FortiSOAR FortiSOAR PaaS FortiGuard FortiEndpoint Products confirmed NOT Impacted: FortiOS FortiManager FortiAnalyzer FortiWeb FortiMail FortiClient Linux FortiClient Windows FortiClient MacOS FortiSASE FortiAuthenticator FortiSwitch FortiNAC Virtual Patch No Timeline 2026-10-21: Initial publication References https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-109618 IR Number FG-IR-26-186 Published Date Oct 21, 2026 Component OTHERS Severity Critical Discovered Third-Party Library Attack Type Unauthenticated Known Exploited No CVSSv3 Score 9.8 Impact Execute unauthorized code or commands CVE ID CVE-2026-109618 Download CVRF CSAF

rcephpcve内存破坏 @forti-ir 原文 ↗
必看5

明确 PAN 产品的受影响范围与修复路径,可据此核对暴露版本

Palo Alto Networks Security Advisories / CVE-2026-109618 CVE-2026-109618 Impact of Critical Vulnerabilities in PHP (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619) on Palo Alto Networks Products Urgency MODERATE Severity 8.7 · HIGH Exploit Maturity N/A Response Effort MODERATE Recovery USER Value Density DIFFUSE Attack Vector NETWORK Attack Complexity LOW Attack Requirements NONE Automatable NO User Interaction NONE Product Confidentiality NONE Product Integrity NONE Product Availability HIGH Privileges Required NONE Subsequent Confidentiality NONE Subsequent Integrity NONE Subsequent Availability NONE CVE JSON CSAF Published 2026-10-21 Updated 2026-10-21 Discovered internally Description Palo Alto Networks is aware of two critical vulnerabilities in PHP: CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. CVE-2026-109618 involves a remote code execution vulnerability where handling out-of-memory errors via longjmp() leaves request memory uninitialized due to improper control flow management, allowing attackers to reliably achieve RCE using out-of-memory (OOM) triggers. CVE-2026-109619 describes a remote code execution vulnerability where longjmp() fatal error handling leaves global memory pointing to freed memory regions. These regions can later be read or branched on during subsequent requests, enabling attackers to execute arbitrary code. Palo Alto Networks has conducted an evaluation of our product portfolio regarding this issue; a summary of the status across products is provided in the table below. We will update the below table when we get more information. Product Status Versions Affected Unaffected Bridgecrew None All Cloud NGFW None All Cortex XDR Agent None All Cortex XSIAM None All Cortex XSOAR None All Cortex Xpanse None All GlobalProtect App None All Idira None All PAN-OS 12.2 All 12.1 All 11.2 All 11.1 All 10.2 All 12.2 None (ETA: TBD) 12.1 None (ETA: TBD) 11.2 None (ETA: TBD) 11.1 None (ETA: TBD) 10.2 None (ETA: TBD) Panorama All None (ETA: TBD) Prisma Cloud None All Prisma Access None All Prisma Access Agent None All Required Configuration for Exposure No special configuration is required to be affected by this issue. Severity: HIGH, Suggested Urgency: MODERATE The risk is highest on PAN-OS when you allow access to the management interface from external IP addresses on the internet. Based on our assessment the CVSS score of this issue in our product is CVSS-B: 8.7 ( CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/AU:N/R:U/V:D/RE:M/U:Amber ) You can reduce the risk of exploitation by restricting access to a jump box that is the only system allowed to access the management interface. CVSS-B: 7.1 ( CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/AU:N/R:U/V:D/RE:M/U:Amber ) Vendor CVSS-B: 9.2 ( CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N ) Exploitation Status Palo Alto Networks is not aware of any malicious exploitation of this issue against our products. Weakness Type and Impact CWE-754 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions CAPEC-153 Input Data Manipulation Solution PAN-OS This issue will be fixed in the upcoming releases of PAN-OS. This advisory will be updated with fixed versions and release estimates as they become available. Until PAN-OS fix versions are available we recommend implementing the workaround and mitigations listed below. See https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cve-2026-109618-cve-2026-109619/ for more details on the Palo Alto Networks product capabilities to protect against attacks that exploit this issue. Workarounds and Mitigations Customers with Frontier Virtual Patching (ATP Plus) on PAN-OS 12.2.4 and later versions received advance coverage, released via Threat ID 543004, which was released at 10:21 PM PT on Oct 20. Customers with a Threat Prevention subscription are provided with coverage against this vulnerability by enabling Threat ID 543004, 97622, 97623, 97624 and 97625 (from Applications and Threats content version 9162 and later). For these Threat IDs to protect against attacks for this vulnerability: Route incoming traffic for the MGT port through a DP port , e.g., enabling management profile on a DP interface for management access. Replace the Certificate for Inbound Traffic Management . Decrypt inbound traffic to the management interface so the firewall can inspect it . Enable threat prevention on the inbound traffic to management services. The security risk posed by this issue on PAN-OS and Panorama is minimized by restricting access to the management interface to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended best practice deployment guidelines . Frequently Asked Questions Q. Is GlobalProtect™ impacted? GlobalProtect ™ portal and gateway are not impacted. Q. Is Captive Portal impacted? The captive portal is not impacted. Q. Which part of the PAN-OS® product is affected? This issue strictly affects the management web interface, which includes the HTTPS web UI and XML API service. Q. Does it affect any standard dataplane interface, or specifically ones with a management profile attached? It affects the dataplane interface only if a management profile is attached to it. Q. When will PAN-OS fixes be available? Patches will be made available as quickly as possible. Please monitor the security advisory for the latest information on mitigations and updates . CPE Applicability cpe:2.3:a:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* is vulnerable from (including)12.2_all OR cpe:2.3:a:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* is vulnerable from (including)12.1_all OR cpe:2.3:a:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* is vulnerable from (including)11.2_all OR cpe:2.3:a:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* is vulnerable from (including)11.1_all OR cpe:2.3:a:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* is vulnerable from (including)10.2_all or cpe:2.3:a:palo_alto_networks:panorama:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* is vulnerable from (including)all Timeline 2026-10-21 Threat ID released and details updated. 2026-10-21 Updated the status of Cortex XSIAM and Prisma Cloud as not impacted. 2026-10-21 Updated the status of GlobalProtect App and Prisma Access Agent as not impacted. Also updated the Frequently Asked question (FAQ) section. 2026-10-21 Initial Publication

cvercephp @paloalto-advisory 原文 ↗

未认证远程即可利用,边界接入设备直接暴露,且无替代缓解措施

A vulnerability in Cisco Expressway Series could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to obtain sensitive information from an affected device. This vulnerability is due to insufficient authorization checks of HTTP requests during Mobile and Remote Access (MRA) provisioning. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted URL request to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to access sensitive information that they would otherwise not have authorization to access. Note: Cisco Expressway Series refers to Cisco Expressway Core (Expressway-C) devices and Cisco Expressway Edge (Expressway-E) devices. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-expressway-inf-disc-vvYqgSTS This advisory is part of a group of advisories. For a complete list of the advisories and links to them, see Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of October 21, 2026, Security Advisories . In addition, for further documentation of improvements and fixes in Cisco Expressway Series see Cisco Expressway Series Security Hardening Release: October 2026 . <br/>Security Impact Rating: Medium <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-76435

信息泄露cve边界设备 @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗

未认证即可绕过访问控制,统一通信管理面通常是内网高价值入口。

A vulnerability in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Unified CM) and Cisco Unified Communications Manager Session Management Edition (Unified CM SME) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct access control bypass attacks on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to improper input validation for specific HTTP requests. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to access parts of the network that are beyond the scope of their intended access. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-cucm-access-PW9e8Jt2 This advisory is part of a group of advisories. For a complete list of the advisories and links to them, see Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of October 21, 2026, Security Advisories . In addition, for further documentation of improvements and fixes in Cisco Unified CM, see Cisco Unified Communications Products Security Hardening Release: October 2026 . <br/>Security Impact Rating: Medium <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-76487

绕过未认证http统一通信 @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗

设计层面的认证缺失,任何本地落脚点都能借此获得检测进程权限。

A vulnerability in the control channel socket implementation of Open Source Snort 3 could allow an authenticated, local attacker with low privileges to execute arbitrary commands as the Snort 3 process user. This vulnerability is due to a lack of authentication when a local user connects to the Snort control channel socket. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by connecting to the Snort 3 control channel socket as a local user. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands as well as read and write Snort 3 process memory. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-opensrc-snort3-2fXGJPfe This advisory is part of a group of advisories. For a complete list of the advisories and links to them, see Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of October 21, 2026, Security Advisories . In addition, for further documentation of improvements and fixes in Open Source Snort 3, see Multiple Cisco Products Snort 3 Security Hardening Release: October 2026 . <br/>Security Impact Rating: High <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-76524

rcesnort本地攻击socket @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗

终端代理装机量极大,低权本地用户可借构造 IPC 消息提权并写文件。

A vulnerability in the interprocess communication (IPC) channel of the Secure Firewall Posture module in Cisco Secure Client could allow an authenticated, local attacker to elevate privileges on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a series of crafted IPC messages to a local socket. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to perform limited file write operations on the filesystem with SYSTEM or root privileges. Although this vulnerability affects the Secure Firewall Posture module in Cisco Secure Client on Windows, macOS, and Linux operating systems, this vulnerability could be used to obtain full root privileges on macOS and Linux. For that reason Cisco has assigned this security advisory a Security Impact Rating (SIR) of High rather than Medium as the score indicates. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sec-client-priv-esc-muF8eZdm <br/>Security Impact Rating: High <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-76462

lpeipc端点客户端 @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗
推荐13

从检测侧给出这两枚 PHP 漏洞的落地观测点,可直接借鉴

1 min read October 2026 PHP vulnerabilities: Sandfly is not affected Sandfly Security - Agentless Linux EDR and Incident Response : Published October 21, 2026 News Malware Linux Security AI 21 October 2026 Two critical PHP flaws are forcing organisations worldwide to patch or take websites offline. Sandfly installations are not affected, and Sandfly is likely to detect attackers using these exploits on the systems it protects. What happened On 21 October 2026, the PHP project announced two critical vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, and released an emergency fix. PHP is the programming language behind a large share of the world's websites. Both flaws are remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities: they can let an attacker run their own commands on a web server without needing a password. The flaws were found with the help of AI and had gone unnoticed for years. Cyber agencies in the US, UK, Australia and Europe told organisations to patch straight away or take PHP sites offline until they could. Several government websites went dark as a precaution. Is Sandfly affected? No. Sandfly does not use PHP in any of its components. Neither the Sandfly container image nor the Postgres container image included in our distribution has PHP installed. How to detect PHP exploit activity on your Linux servers CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 are PHP remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities. Once attackers exploit a PHP RCE flaw, they typically try to open a reverse shell, plant a bindshell backdoor, or set up cron and at jobs so their access survives a reboot. Patching PHP stops new attacks, but it won't remove a backdoor planted before the patch. Sandfly already detects this class of Linux attack, so it can help you find signs of PHP exploitation across your Linux servers. "Based on the public information available about how these exploits work, Sandfly is likely to identify them being used to gain shell access on the systems it protects." Matthew, Chief Architect/R&D USA, Sandfly Sandfly detections for the PHP RCE vulnerabilities The following sandflies are among those that may identify malicious activity related to CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. Reverse shell and bindshell backdoor detection process_backdoor_bindshell_network_enabled_parent_www_user process_backdoor_bindshell_reverse_generic_1 process_backdoor_bindshell_reverse_php process_shell_running_file_descriptors_php_1 process_shell_running_file_descriptors_php_2 (disabled by default, see note*) * Note: process_shell_running_file_descriptors_php_2 is disabled by default because it has a higher risk of false positives. If you run Linux systems with PHP, we recommend enabling it, or running manual scans with it, until you've upgraded to a patched PHP version. Linux persistence detection against RCE file_binary_system_in_www_dir: moving system utilities for future use process_persistence_at_jobs_backdoor: re-establish their network sockets after machine reboots. process_persistence_cron_backdoor: re-establish their network sockets after machine reboots. Questions? Sandfly Customer Support Not using Sandfly yet? Talk to an expert Tweet Sandfly 4.2.3 - OpenSSL CVE-2022-3602 and CVE-2022-3786 Update Sandfly Security - Agentless Linux EDR and Incident Response : 01 November 2022 Sandfly is not affected by OpenSSL vulnerabilities CVE-2022-3602 and CVE-2022-3786 but released an update with patched libraries out of an abundance... News Product Update Read More Hunting Linux Implants Agentlessly at Locked Shields 2026 Sandfly Security - Agentless Linux EDR and Incident Response : 15 June 2026 Sandfly's agentless Linux EDR used to defend systems at the NATO Locked Shields 2026 cyber defense exercise. News Public Sector Read More Agentless Incident Response Sandflies and More Stealth Rootkit De-Cloaking: Sandfly 1.4.2 Released Sandfly Security - Agentless Linux EDR and Incident Response : 03 September 2018 Sandfly 1.4.2 Update Sandfly 1.4.2 is now released. News Product Update Read More

检测phpcve @sandflysecurity-blog 原文 ↗

未认证远程发包即可打瘫运营商级路由器,攻击面是公网路由平面

A vulnerability in the IPv4 packet processing functionality of Cisco IOS XR Software that affects Cisco ASR 9000 and 9900 Series Aggregation Services Routers as well as Cisco ASR 9902 and 9903 Compact High-Performance Routers could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause network processor (NP) errors, resulting in a line card reset or shutdown and a denial of service (DoS) condition. This vulnerability is due to the incorrect handling of crafted IPv4 packets that are received on an affected line card interface and processed as for-us traffic. The issue can result in an NP reset, causing traffic loss on the affected line card while it recovers. Under repeated reset conditions, the network processor may enter a persistent shutdown state, in which case an explicit line card reload may be required to restore traffic. The vulnerability is within the IPv4 packet-processing path. Transit IPv4 traffic does not trigger this issue and IPv6 traffic cannot trigger it. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asr9k-tUyxcyXN <br/>Security Impact Rating: High <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-76505

doscve网络设备 @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗

带初始导出调用与自动注入的现成工具,可作红队与逆向试验件

Xinjector v0.1.0 — yet another DLL injector been working on this for a while, figured i'd share it. nothing crazy, just a clean injector with some actually useful features instead of the usual 2005-looking loader what it does: standard LoadLibrary injection, x86 + x64. arch mismatch? it tells you instead of dying silently auto-saves every DLL you inject into a dlls/ folder next to the exe, one-click reuse can call an init export after loading auto-inject watcher — type an exe name, it injects when the process shows up memory read/write/pattern scan built into the UI what it doesn't do: no manual map, no hijack, no hiding modules. loads like a normal citizen and that's on purpose, go write your own if you want that stuff won't beat EAC/BE/Vanguard. don't even try, you'll just catch a ban needs: windows 10/11 x64. asks for admin every launch Approved: https://www.unknowncheats.me/forum/d...=file&id=58463 bug reports with the log output are welcome.

工具注入逆向 @unknowncheats-ac 原文 ↗

IDS 自身被打挂即形成检测盲区,构造流量成本极低

Multiple Cisco products are affected by a vulnerability in the Snort 3 SMTP MIME Decoder that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause the Snort 3 Detection Engine to restart. This vulnerability is due to a lack of error checking when the MIME fields of the SMTP header are parsed. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted SMTP packets through an established connection to be parsed by Snort 3. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition when the Snort 3 Detection Engine unexpectedly restarts. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-snort3-mime-vulns-bkXjcKkt This advisory is part of a group of advisories. For a complete list of the advisories and links to them, see Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of October 21, 2026, Security Advisories . In addition, for further documentation of improvements and fixes in Snort 3, see Multiple Cisco Products Snort 3 Security Hardening Release: October 2026 . <br/>Security Impact Rating: Medium <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-20011

dosidscve @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗

内部审计产出的越界写集合,说明检测引擎解析面仍有内存破坏风险。

As part of Cisco's ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, the Cisco owned Open Source Snort 3 Software engineering team has conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in software hardening releases that address multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities tracked by CVE-2026-20043 are related to issues concerning out-of-bounds writes that are grouped under the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Base CWE-787. As part of Cisco's ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, the Cisco-owned Open Source Snort 3 engineering team has conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in software hardening releases that address multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing and are not known to be actively exploited. To assist customers in patching and to streamline the disclosure process, Cisco has grouped these issues by their underlying vulnerability class - Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) - and assigned a single Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Identifier (CVE ID) to each CWE grouping. Note: Cisco may publish separate security advisories that provide additional details about individual vulnerabilities that are addressed in this release. Cisco has released software updates that address these vulnerabilities. There are no workarounds that address these vulnerabilities. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-hardening-snort3-ybgmhTQe This advisory is part of a group of advisories. For a complete list of the advisories and links to them, see Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of October 21, 2026, Security Advisories . <br/>Security Impact Rating: Critical <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-20043,CVE-2026-20236,CVE-2026-20291,CVE-2026-20356

cve内存破坏snort加固 @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗

VBA 数据可远程投递,绕过邮件网关即可打掉检测引擎造成盲区。

A vulnerability in the Snort 3 Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) Decompression Engine of multiple Cisco products could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause the Snort 3 Detection Engine to restart unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. This vulnerability is due to improper range checking when Snort 3 decompresses VBA data, which is user controlled. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted VBA data to the Snort 3 Detection Engine of a targeted device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause an overflow of stack data, which could result in a DoS condition. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There is a workaround that addresses this vulnerability. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-snort3-vba-bufdos-jAuFdvn9 This advisory is part of a group of advisories. For a complete list of the advisories and links to them, see Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of October 21, 2026, Security Advisories . In addition, for further documentation of improvements and fixes in Open Source Snort 3, see Multiple Cisco Products Snort 3 Security Hardening Release: October 2026 . <br/>Security Impact Rating: Medium <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-20218

dossnort解析器 @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗

隧道封装流量可直接远程触发,暴露在互联网的 IPS 存在可用性风险。

Multiple Cisco products are affected by a vulnerability in the generic routing encapsulation (GRE) tunnel decapsulation feature of the Snort 3 Detection Engine that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause an unexpected restart of the Snort 3 Detection Engine. This vulnerability is due to improper handling of nested GRE traffic. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted GRE payload through an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to trigger an unexpected reload of the Snort 3 Detection Engine, resulting in either a bypass or denial of service (DoS) condition, depending on device configuration. For more information, see the Details section of this advisory. The Snort 3 Detection Engine will restart automatically. No manual intervention is required. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-snort3-gre-JNpMHrTv This advisory is part of a group of advisories. For a complete list of the advisories and links to them, see Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of October 21, 2026, Security Advisories . In addition, for further documentation of improvements and fixes in Open Source Snort 3, see Multiple Cisco Products Snort 3 Security Hardening Release: October 2026 . <br/>Security Impact Rating: Medium <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-20221

dossnortgre网络 @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗

移动核心网场景常见 GTP 流量,伪造分片包即可反复中断检测引擎。

Multiple Cisco products are affected by a vulnerability in the Snort 3 Detection Engine that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause the detection engine to unexpectedly restart, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. The vulnerability is due to a flaw in logic handling when General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) Tunneling Protocol (GTP) extension headers are processed within the codec. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted, fragmented UDP datagram that contains these headers to the Snort 3 Detection Engine of an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the detection engine to enter an infinite loop, resulting in a DoS condition. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are workarounds that address this vulnerability. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-snort3-gtpcodec-dos-Rmecfepz This advisory is part of a group of advisories. For a complete list of the advisories and links to them, see Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of October 21, 2026, Security Advisories . In addition, for further documentation of improvements and fixes in Open Source Snort 3, see Multiple Cisco Products Snort 3 Security Hardening Release: October 2026 . <br/>Security Impact Rating: Medium <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-76445

dossnortgtp @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗

真实呈现多智能体评测中浏览权限与凭证失控的完整利用链。

一支运行在腾讯云上的智能体队伍,为了查几个公园入口的导航占比,借浏览器、借收件箱、借泄露的密钥,最后被一组独立研究者从公开记录里一路溯源到腾讯云。腾讯随后承认,这是评测第三方模型时出现的非预期浏览行为。

ai_agent事件云凭证泄露 @yage-share 原文 ↗

本地提权可放大初始立足点,NTLM 组件覆盖面稳定且补丁已发布。

# CVE-2026-83709 - Windows NTLM Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows NTLM allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. CWE: CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow

lpentlmcve @msrc 原文 ↗

SharePoint 常暴露于外网,XSS 可直接用于钓鱼与内容伪造。

# CVE-2026-97783 - Microsoft Office SharePoint Spoofing Vulnerability Improper neutralization of input during web page generation ('cross-site scripting') in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network. CWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

xsssharepointcve @msrc 原文 ↗

文件系统层缺陷常用于提权链与恶意镜像触发场景。

# CVE-2026-69902 - Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Untrusted pointer dereference in Windows NTFS allows an authorized attacker to execute code locally. CWE: CWE-822: Untrusted Pointer Dereference

rcentfscve内存破坏 @msrc 原文 ↗

补全 WASM AOT 逆向流程,可用于分析预编译与混淆模块。

﷽ Hello, cybersecurity enthusiasts and white hackers! In part 2 , we joined FUNCTION and EXPORT to recover names for the native functions in a WAMR .aot file. Now we can locate fib . The next question is: where does it reference another function, and which function is that? This time we decode RELOCATION : its symbol table, string buffer, groups, and individual records. Then we connect a patch location to its containing function and resolve targets such as aot_func#2 . The result is a native cross-reference: fib -> fib . Still C, still no external libraries. I am giving the Ghidra handoff its own fourth part. The series now has four steps: part result 1 container sections and target architecture 2 function offsets and exported names 3 relocation records and native cross-references 4 bring the code, names, and references into Ghidra For this example I keep the same compiler as before: wamrc 2.4.5 , producing AOT format version 5 . The parser below deliberately accepts that version and little-endian ELF relocatable targets. The format description follows the release’s AOT emitter . practical example We reuse our small module: // add.c int add ( int a , int b ) { return a + b ; } int fib ( int n ) { return n < 2 ? n : fib ( n - 1 ) + fib ( n - 2 ); } If you already have add.aot from part 2, keep it. To rebuild it with the wamrc from part 1: ./wamrc --version clang --target = wasm32 -O2 -nostdlib -Wl ,--no-entry -Wl ,--export-all -o add.wasm add.c ./wamrc -o add.aot add.wasm The listings below use the supplied sample. Rebuilding it here with Clang 19.1.7 and wamrc 2.4.5 produced the same AOT bytes; other compiler versions or options can change the offsets. first, correct the native-code base Before recovering references, there is a correction to part 2. We treated the TEXT section body as the start of native code. In this format the body actually begins with a literal-size field: TEXT body: u32 literal_size u8 literals[literal_size] u8 code[remaining bytes] code_file_offset = TEXT_body_file_offset + 4 + literal_size The release loader’s load_text_section() advances past that prefix before using function offsets. Our sample has literal_size = 0 , but the four-byte field is still present. The code begins at 0x154 , not 0x150 . Consequently, the file offsets printed in part 2 were four bytes early: add starts at 0x164 and fib at 0x174 . Also, the distance to the next function offset is a span , which can include alignment padding. For the last function, our upper bound is the remaining code region. We should not call either value an exact machine-code size. the RELOCATION layout Section type 5 has two pieces. First comes a symbol directory: u32 symbol_count u32 symbol_offsets[symbol_count] u32 total_string_len u8 string_buffer[total_string_len] each symbol_offsets[i] points inside string_buffer: u16 length u8 bytes[length] // terminating NUL is included An index selects an entry in symbol_offsets[] ; that entry selects a length-prefixed string. It does not point directly into the file. Group names such as .rela.text and target names such as aot_func#2 share this directory. After the string buffer, aligned to four bytes, come the groups: u32 group_count repeat group_count: u32 group_name_index u32 relocation_count repeat relocation_count: word offset word addend u32 relocation_type u32 symbol_index Here word is u64 for a 64-bit target and u32 for a 32-bit target. That choice comes from TARGET_INFO , not the architecture of the computer running unaot . A record therefore occupies 24 or 16 bytes. The emitter aligns these records to four bytes, including their 64-bit fields . Rounding them to eight desynchronizes this very sample. offset is relative to the region named by the group. For a text group it is a location in native code. addend is a signed adjustment represented in that target-width word. relocation_type describes the architecture-specific operation; the number 4 does not mean the same thing on every CPU. step 1: read within section boundaries We reuse reader.h from part 1. Each section now gets its own reader view, so a corrupt relocation cannot consume bytes belonging to a following section. This small helper advances the cursor only after checking both alignment padding and data: static size_t take ( reader_t * r , size_t n , size_t alignment ) { size_t pad = ( alignment - r -> pos % alignment ) % alignment ; if ( r -> err || ! rd_ok ( r , r -> pos , pad )) { r -> err = 1 ; return 0 ; } r -> pos += pad ; if ( ! rd_ok ( r , r -> pos , n )) { r -> err = 1 ; return 0 ; } size_t at = r -> pos ; r -> pos += n ; return at ; } The target-width read uses four-byte alignment in both cases: static uint64_t word ( reader_t * r ) { size_t p = take ( r , g_is64 ? 8 : 4 , 4 ); if ( r -> err ) return 0 ; return g_is64 ? rd_u64_at ( r , p ) : rd_u32_at ( r , p ); } The updated decode_text() reads the literal length, checks that it fits, and saves the correct file base: uint32_t literals = u32 ( r ); take ( r , literals , 1 ); if ( r -> err ) return 0 ; g_code_file = body + r -> pos ; g_code_size = r -> len - r -> pos ; step 2: resolve symbol indices The string buffer gets a separate reader too. reloc_symbol() checks the index before accessing the offset directory, then checks that the offset stays inside that buffer: static const char * reloc_symbol ( reader_t * r , size_t offsets , reader_t strings , uint32_t count , uint32_t idx ) { if ( idx >= count ) { r -> err = 1 ; return NULL ; } uint32_t off = rd_u32_at ( r , offsets + ( size_t ) idx * 4 ); if ( r -> err || off % 2 || ! rd_ok ( & strings , off , 2 )) { r -> err = 1 ; return NULL ; } strings . pos = off ; const char * s = string ( & strings ); if ( strings . err ) r -> err = 1 ; return r -> err ? NULL : s ; } string() validates the two-byte length, the complete byte range, and the counted final NUL. It returns a pointer into the input buffer, which remains alive until parsing finishes. Names are not silently truncated into a smaller local array. The start of decode_relocations() gathers this directory and checks every symbol before processing groups: uint32_t count = u32 ( r ); if ( r -> err || count > r -> len / 4 ) return 0 ; size_t offsets = take ( r , ( size_t ) count * 4 , 4 ); uint32_t total = u32 ( r ); size_t start = take ( r , total , 1 ); if ( r -> err ) return 0 ; reader_t strings ; rd_init ( & strings , r -> base + start , total ); for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < count ; i ++ ) if ( ! reloc_symbol ( r , offsets , strings , count , i )) return 0 ; step 3: recover the source and target functions For .text , .rel.text , and .rela.text , we locate the source by finding the function span containing the relocation offset: static int func_at ( uint64_t off ) { for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < g_fcount ; i ++ ) { uint64_t end = i + 1 < g_fcount ? g_foff [ i + 1 ] : g_code_size ; if ( off >= g_foff [ i ] && off < end ) return ( int ) i ; } return - 1 ; } For our recursive call, off = 0x3b lies in the span beginning at 0x20 , which belongs to defined function 2 : fib . The target symbol is aot_func#2 . That suffix is a defined-function index , so it addresses g_foff[2] directly. We validate the entire decimal suffix and require it to be in range. Its target is code offset 0x20 , or file offset 0x154 + 0x20 = 0x174 . Export names use a different index space: they include imported functions. This version therefore accepts --imports N . For our self-contained module, --imports 0 is known to be correct. If the import count is unknown, omit the option: references still use aot_func#N , and the tool leaves export names unresolved instead of assuming zero imports. Reading that count directly from INIT_DATA remains future work. step 4: walk the records For each group, the full program resolves its name and checks that relocation_count fits in the remaining section bytes. The record itself is small: uint64_t off = word ( r ), raw_addend = word ( r ); uint32_t type = u32 ( r ), idx = u32 ( r ); const char * name = reloc_symbol ( r , offsets , strings , count , idx ); if ( r -> err || ( text && off >= g_code_size )) return 0 ; int from = text ? func_at ( off ) : - 1 ; int to = defined_symbol ( name ); We print the relocation type, signed addend, target symbol, patch location, and containing function. When the target is a defined function, we also print its name and file address. References to runtime helpers or data stay visible as symbolic targets. That target file address is the function symbol’s base. The addend stays separate; interpreting the final referenced address still requires the relocation type. A relocation is not automatically a call. The output records references; we still inspect the instruction before describing a particular edge as a recursive call. It also does not represent a complete call graph: inline code and indirect calls require additional analysis. full source code Now the complete program ( unaot.c ). Keep the unchanged reader.h from part 1 beside it; both files are included in the companion source directory. The section table is collected first, then decoded in dependency order: target, code, functions, exports, relocations. /* * unaot.c - part 3: WAMR AOT v5 relocations and native-code xrefs. * author: cocomelonc * https://cocomelonc.github.io/reverse/2026/10/20/wasm-aot-reversing-3.html */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <string.h> #include <inttypes.h> #include <unistd.h> #include "reader.h" #define MAXF 8192 #define COLOR(s) (g_color ? (s) : "") #define RESET COLOR("\x1b[0m") #define TITLE COLOR("\x1b[1;36m") #define SYMBOL COLOR("\x1b[1;35m") static int g_color , g_is64 , g_imports_known ; static uint16_t g_machine ; static uint32_t g_imports , g_fcount , g_expn ; static size_t g_code_file , g_code_size ; static uint64_t g_foff [ MAXF ]; static uint32_t g_ftype [ MAXF ]; static struct { uint32_t index ; const char * name ; } g_exp [ MAXF ]; typedef struct { size_t body ; uint32_t size ; int seen ; } section_t ; /* All sequential reads are confined to the current section. */ static size_t take ( reader_t * r , size_t n , size_t alignment ) { size_t pad = ( alignment - r -> pos % alignment ) % alignment ; if ( r -> err || ! rd_ok ( r , r -> pos , pad )) { r -> err = 1 ; return 0 ; } r -> pos += pad ; if ( ! rd_ok ( r , r -> pos , n )) { r -> err = 1 ; return 0 ; } size_t at = r -> pos ; r -> pos += n ; return at ; } static uint16_t u16 ( reader_t * r ) { size_t p = take ( r , 2 , 2 ); return r -> err ? 0 : rd_u16_at ( r , p ); } static uint32_t u32 ( reader_t * r ) { size_t p = take ( r , 4 , 4 ); return r -> err ? 0 : rd_u32_at ( r , p ); } static uint64_t word ( reader_t * r ) { size_t p = take ( r , g_is64 ? 8 : 4 , 4 ); /* u64 is only 4-aligned! */ if ( r -> err ) return 0 ; return g_is64 ? rd_u64_at ( r , p ) : rd_u32_at ( r , p ); } static const char * string ( reader_t * r ) { uint16_t n = u16 ( r ); size_t p = take ( r , n , 1 ); if ( r -> err || n == 0 ) { r -> err = 1 ; return NULL ; } const char * s = ( const char * ) r -> base + p ; if ( s [ n - 1 ] != '\0' || memchr ( s , '\0' , n - 1 )) { r -> err = 1 ; return NULL ; } return s ; } static const char * function_name ( uint32_t i , char fallback [ 32 ]) { if ( g_imports_known ) for ( uint32_t k = 0 ; k < g_expn ; k ++ ) if ( g_exp [ k ]. index >= g_imports && g_exp [ k ]. index - g_imports == i ) return g_exp [ k ]. name ; snprintf ( fallback , 32 , "aot_func#%u" , i ); return fallback ; } static int func_at ( uint64_t off ) { for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < g_fcount ; i ++ ) { uint64_t end = i + 1 < g_fcount ? g_foff [ i + 1 ] : g_code_size ; if ( off >= g_foff [ i ] && off < end ) return ( int ) i ; } return - 1 ; } static int defined_symbol ( const char * s ) { const char * prefix = "aot_func#" ; if ( strncmp ( s , prefix , strlen ( prefix ))) return - 1 ; s += strlen ( prefix ); if ( * s < '0' || * s > '9' ) return - 1 ; uint32_t n = 0 ; for (; * s ; s ++ ) { if ( * s < '0' || * s > '9' ) return - 1 ; uint32_t digit = ( uint32_t )( * s - '0' ); if ( n > ( UINT32_MAX - digit ) / 10 ) return - 1 ; n = n * 10 + digit ; } return n < g_fcount ? ( int ) n : - 1 ; } static const char * reloc_type ( uint32_t t ) { if ( g_machine == 3 ) switch ( t ) { case 1 : return "R_386_32" ; case 2 : return "R_386_PC32" ; case 4 : return "R_386_PLT32" ; } if ( g_machine == 0x3e ) switch ( t ) { case 1 : return "R_X86_64_64" ; case 2 : return "R_X86_64_PC32" ; case 4 : return "R_X86_64_PLT32" ; case 9 : return "R_X86_64_GOTPCREL" ; case 41 : return "R_X86_64_GOTPCRELX" ; case 42 : return "R_X86_64_REX_GOTPCRELX" ; } if ( g_machine == 0xb7 ) switch ( t ) { case 257 : return "R_AARCH64_ABS64" ; case 275 : return "R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21" ; case 277 : return "R_AARCH64_ADD_ABS_LO12_NC" ; case 282 : return "R_AARCH64_JUMP26" ; case 283 : return "R_AARCH64_CALL26" ; } if ( g_machine == 0xf3 ) switch ( t ) { case 2 : return "R_RISCV_64" ; case 18 : return "R_RISCV_CALL" ; case 19 : return "R_RISCV_CALL_PLT" ; case 23 : return "R_RISCV_PCREL_HI20" ; case 24 : return "R_RISCV_PCREL_LO12_I" ; } return "unknown relocation" ; } static int decode_target ( reader_t * r ) { if ( r -> len < 48 ) return 0 ; uint16_t bin = rd_u16_at ( r , 0 ), type = rd_u16_at ( r , 4 ); if (( bin != 0 && bin != 2 ) || type != 1 ) { fputs ( "need a little-endian ELF relocatable AOT target \n " , stderr ); return 0 ; } g_is64 = ( bin == 2 ); g_machine = rd_u16_at ( r , 6 ); printf ( "target: %.*s, %u-bit, machine=0x%x \n " , 16 , ( const char * ) r -> base + 32 , g_is64 ? 64 : 32 , g_machine ); return ! r -> err ; } static int decode_text ( reader_t * r , size_t body ) { uint32_t literals = u32 ( r ); take ( r , literals , 1 ); if ( r -> err ) return 0 ; g_code_file = body + r -> pos ; g_code_size = r -> len - r -> pos ; printf ( "TEXT: body@0x%zx, literal_size=%u, code@0x%zx, code span=%zu \n " , body , literals , g_code_file , g_code_size ); return 1 ; } static uint32_t try_functions ( reader_t * r , uint32_t extra ) { uint32_t wsz = g_is64 ? 8 : 4 ; if ( r -> len % ( wsz + 4 + extra )) return 0 ; size_t count = r -> len / ( wsz + 4 + extra ); if ( count == 0 || count > MAXF ) return 0 ; uint64_t previous = 0 ; for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < count ; i ++ ) { uint64_t off = g_is64 ? rd_u64_at ( r , i * wsz ) : rd_u32_at ( r , i * wsz ); if ( r -> err || off >= g_code_size || ( i && off < previous )) return 0 ; previous = off ; } return ( uint32_t ) count ; } static int decode_functions ( reader_t * r ) { if ( r -> len == 0 ) { g_fcount = 0 ; return 1 ; } uint32_t basic = try_functions ( r , 0 ), frames = try_functions ( r , 8 ); if (( ! basic && ! frames ) || ( basic && frames )) { fputs ( "unsupported or ambiguous FUNCTION layout \n " , stderr ); return 0 ; } g_fcount = basic ? basic : frames ; for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < g_fcount ; i ++ ) g_foff [ i ] = word ( r ); for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < g_fcount ; i ++ ) g_ftype [ i ] = u32 ( r ); if ( frames ) take ( r , ( size_t ) g_fcount * 8 , 4 ); return ! r -> err && r -> pos == r -> len ; } static int decode_exports ( reader_t * r ) { uint32_t count = u32 ( r ); if ( r -> err || count > r -> len / 8 ) return 0 ; for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < count ; i ++ ) { uint32_t index = u32 ( r ); size_t p = take ( r , 1 , 1 ); uint8_t kind = r -> err ? 0 : rd_u8_at ( r , p ); const char * name = string ( r ); if ( r -> err ) return 0 ; if ( kind == 0 ) { if ( g_expn == MAXF ) return 0 ; g_exp [ g_expn ]. index = index ; g_exp [ g_expn ++ ]. name = name ; } return 1 ; } static void print_functions ( void ) { printf ( " \n %s== defined functions ==%s \n " , TITLE , RESET ); if ( ! g_imports_known ) puts ( "export names unresolved: supply --imports N if known" ); for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < g_fcount ; i ++ ) { char buf [ 32 ]; uint64_t end = i + 1 < g_fcount ? g_foff [ i + 1 ] : g_code_size ; printf ( "[%u] code+0x%" PRIx64 " file@0x%" PRIx64 " span=%" PRIu64 " type=%u %s%s%s \n " , i , g_foff [ i ], ( uint64_t ) g_code_file + g_foff [ i ], end - g_foff [ i ], g_ftype [ i ], SYMBOL , function_name ( i , buf ), RESET ); } static const char * reloc_symbol ( reader_t * r , size_t offsets , reader_t strings , uint32_t count , uint32_t idx ) { if ( idx >= count ) { r -> err = 1 ; return NULL ; } uint32_t off = rd_u32_at ( r , offsets + ( size_t ) idx * 4 ); if ( r -> err || off % 2 || ! rd_ok ( & strings , off , 2 )) { r -> err = 1 ; return NULL ; } strings . pos = off ; const char * s = string ( & strings ); if ( strings . err ) r -> err = 1 ; return r -> err ? NULL : s ; } static int decode_relocations ( reader_t * r ) { uint32_t count = u32 ( r ); if ( r -> err || count > r -> len / 4 ) return 0 ; size_t offsets = take ( r , ( size_t ) count * 4 , 4 ); uint32_t total = u32 ( r ); size_t start = take ( r , total , 1 ); if ( r -> err ) return 0 ; reader_t strings ; rd_init ( & strings , r -> base + start , total ); for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < count ; i ++ ) if ( ! reloc_symbol ( r , offsets , strings , count , i )) return 0 ; uint32_t groups = u32 ( r ); if ( r -> err || groups > ( r -> len - r -> pos ) / 8 ) return 0 ; printf ( " \n %s== relocations ==%s \n %u symbols, %u group(s) \n " , TITLE , RESET , count , groups ); for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < groups ; i ++ ) { uint32_t name_idx = u32 ( r ), n = u32 ( r ); const char * group = reloc_symbol ( r , offsets , strings , count , name_idx ); size_t entry = g_is64 ? 24 : 16 ; if ( r -> err || n > ( r -> len - r -> pos ) / entry ) return 0 ; int text = ! strcmp ( group , ".text" ) || ! strcmp ( group , ".rel.text" ) || ! strcmp ( group , ".rela.text" ); printf ( "group %s: %u relocation(s) \n " , group , n ); for ( uint32_t j = 0 ; j < n ; j ++ ) { uint64_t off = word ( r ), raw_addend = word ( r ); uint32_t type = u32 ( r ), idx = u32 ( r ); const char * name = reloc_symbol ( r , offsets , strings , count , idx ); if ( r -> err || ( text && off >= g_code_size )) return 0 ; unsigned bits = g_is64 ? 64 : 32 ; uint64_t sign = UINT64_C ( 1 ) << ( bits - 1 ); uint64_t mask = g_is64 ? UINT64_MAX : UINT32_MAX ; int negative = ( raw_addend & sign ) != 0 ; uint64_t magnitude = negative ? (( ~ raw_addend + 1 ) & mask ) : raw_addend ; printf ( " off=0x%" PRIx64 " %s(%u) -> %s%s%s add=%s%" PRIu64 , off , reloc_type ( type ), type , SYMBOL , name , RESET , negative ? "-" : "" , magnitude ); int from = text ? func_at ( off ) : - 1 ; int to = defined_symbol ( name ); if ( text ) printf ( " file@0x%" PRIx64 , ( uint64_t ) g_code_file + off ); if ( from >= 0 ) { char a [ 32 ], b [ 32 ]; printf ( " | %s+0x%" PRIx64 " -> %s" , function_name (( uint32_t ) from , a ), off - g_foff [ from ], to >= 0 ? function_name (( uint32_t ) to , b ) : name ); if ( to >= 0 ) printf ( " [target file@0x%" PRIx64 "]" , ( uint64_t ) g_code_file + g_foff [ to ]); } putchar ( '\n' ); } return ! r -> err && r -> pos == r -> len ; } static uint8_t * read_file ( const char * path , size_t * len ) { FILE * f = fopen ( path , "rb" ); if ( ! f ) { perror ( path ); return NULL ; } if ( fseek ( f , 0 , SEEK_END )) { fclose ( f ); return NULL ; } long n = ftell ( f ); if ( n < 0 || fseek ( f , 0 , SEEK_SET )) { fclose ( f ); return NULL ; } uint8_t * buf = malloc ( n ? ( size_t ) n : 1 ); if ( ! buf ) { fclose ( f ); return NULL ; } * len = fread ( buf , 1 , ( size_t ) n , f ); int good = * len == ( size_t ) n && ! ferror ( f ); fclose ( f ); if ( ! good ) { free ( buf ); return NULL ; } return buf ; } int main ( int argc , char ** argv ) { const char * path = NULL ; g_color = isatty ( STDOUT_FILENO ) && ! getenv ( "NO_COLOR" ); for ( int i = 1 ; i < argc ; i ++ ) { if ( ! strcmp ( argv [ i ], "--no-color" )) g_color = 0 ; else if ( ! strcmp ( argv [ i ], "--color" )) g_color = 1 ; else if ( ! strcmp ( argv [ i ], "--imports" ) && i + 1 < argc ) { const char * s = argv [ ++ i ]; if ( !* s ) return 1 ; uint32_t n = 0 ; for (; * s ; s ++ ) { if ( * s < '0' || * s > '9' || n > ( UINT32_MAX - ( uint32_t )( * s - '0' )) / 10 ) return 1 ; n = n * 10 + ( uint32_t )( * s - '0' ); } g_imports = n ; g_imports_known = 1 ; } else if ( argv [ i ][ 0 ] == '-' || path ) return 1 ; else path = argv [ i ]; } if ( ! path ) { fprintf ( stderr , "usage: %s [--no-color|--color] [--imports N] file.aot \n " , argv [ 0 ]); return 1 ; } size_t len ; uint8_t * buf = read_file ( path , & len ); if ( ! buf ) return 1 ; reader_t file ; rd_init ( & file , buf , len ); section_t sec [ 6 ] = { 0 }; int ok = 0 ; if ( u32 ( & file ) != 0x746f6100u || u32 ( & file ) != 5 || file . err ) { fputs ( "need a WAMR AOT version 5 file \n " , stderr ); goto done ; } while ( file . pos < file . len ) { uint32_t type = u32 ( & file ), size = u32 ( & file ); size_t body = take ( & file , size , 1 ); if ( file . err ) goto done ; if ( type < 6 ) { if ( sec [ type ]. seen ) goto done ; sec [ type ] = ( section_t ){ body , size , 1 }; } reader_t r [ 6 ]; for ( int i = 0 ; i < 6 ; i ++ ) { if ( ! sec [ i ]. seen ) goto done ; rd_init ( & r [ i ], buf + sec [ i ]. body , sec [ i ]. size ); } if ( ! decode_target ( & r [ 0 ]) || ! decode_text ( & r [ 2 ], sec [ 2 ]. body ) || ! decode_functions ( & r [ 3 ]) || ! decode_exports ( & r [ 4 ])) goto done ; print_functions (); ok = decode_relocations ( & r [ 5 ]); done: if ( ! ok ) fputs ( "invalid, truncated, or unsupported AOT input \n " , stderr ); free ( buf ); return ok ? 0 : 1 ; } demo Compile it: cc -std = c11 -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic -o unaot unaot.c Then run: ./unaot --no-color --imports 0 add.aot For the x86-64 sample, the output is: That last line is the result we wanted: a patch in fib references fib itself. But look carefully at file@0x18f . Is that the beginning of a call instruction? checking the actual instruction Inspect five bytes starting one byte earlier: xxd -g 1 -s 0x18e -l 5 add.aot e8 is the opcode for an x86 relative call. The relocation points to its four-byte displacement field, one byte after the opcode. So we have three different locations: item code-relative offset file offset start of fib 0x20 0x174 call instruction 0x3a 0x18e relocation patch field 0x3b 0x18f Confusing the last two would produce an xref into the middle of an instruction in a disassembler. This matters when we build the Ghidra handoff. Carve the corrected native region and disassemble it: dd if = add.aot of = text.bin bs = 1 skip = 340 count = 84 status = none objdump -D -b binary -m i386:x86-64 text.bin The unrelocated instruction displays a call to 0x3f , because its displacement is still zero. The native bytes alone do not yet express the intended recursive target. For this internal reference, WAMR’s x86-64 relocation implementation uses the symbol address, addend, and patch address: displacement = S + A - P = 0x20 + ( -4 ) - 0x3b = -0x1f after relocation: e8 e1 ff ff ff next instruction 0x3f + ( -0x1f ) = 0x20 = fib The common code base cancels out in that subtraction. External helper symbols can involve runtime addresses or PLT entries; this calculation is specifically for the internal fib reference. Our parser reports metadata and leaves the input file unchanged. Also notice that the C expression contains two recursive calls, while the compiled sample has one recursive call relocation. In this build, the second recursive branch becomes a loop with an accumulator. That is a compiler transformation, not a missing relocation entry. the same reference on another CPU Compile the same Wasm module for AArch64: ./wamrc --target = aarch64 -o add_aarch64.aot add.wasm check: ./unaot --no-color --imports 0 add_aarch64.aot As you can see, the code layout changes, but the reference still resolves. Here the patch is in an AArch64 branch instruction, so the x86 “subtract one byte” observation does not apply. The container parser handles the metadata; interpreting and applying a relocation requires the target architecture. The RISC-V build works with the same parser too: ./wamrc --target = riscv64 -o add_riscv64.aot add.wasm ./unaot --no-color --imports 0 add_riscv64.aot I checked these three targets and an i386 build, which exercises 32-bit record fields. A separate one-import fixture verified the --imports 1 name join. For the small x86-64 sample, all 860 shorter file prefixes were rejected, and targeted corrupt symbol offsets, indices, counts, strings, and code offsets were rejected under AddressSanitizer and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer. These checks cover the demonstrated parser behavior, not every WAMR format variant. side quest: a real device, and a bug in my own assumption While finishing part 2 I pointed an earlier build of this tool at real firmware: the Sony aitrios-sdk-edge-app 1.1.6 edge applications, which ship prebuilt AArch64 .aot at AOT format version 3 . They parsed, and the section table looked healthy. But the exported names did not line up with the code, and the bug was in my tool, not in the files. Here is the relevant part of edge_app_passthrough.arm64.aot : Look at __main_argc_argv : export index 277 , while FUNCTION declares only 258 functions. If an export index addressed a defined function directly, 277 would be out of range. It is valid only because imported host functions are numbered first. WAMR numbers functions as imported 0 .. import_func_count-1 , then defined functions after them. EXPORT uses that global index; FUNCTION uses the defined-only index. My part-2 code had quietly assumed import_func_count == 0 . That is true for our self-contained add.aot , so the bug was invisible there, and real for anything that calls the host. To reproduce it without the vendor binary, part 3 includes a one-import fixture, import.c : // import.c __attribute__ (( import_module ( "env" ), import_name ( "host_tick" ))) extern int host_tick ( int ); int use_tick ( int n ) { return host_tick ( n ) + 1 ; } int bounce ( int n ) { return n <= 0 ? use_tick ( n ) : bounce ( n - 1 ) + use_tick ( n ); } One imported function, two defined, plus the compiler’s __wasm_call_ctors . I keep both behaviors in the shipped tool, so the difference is visible. --imports 0 reproduces the old assumption: ./unaot --no-color --imports 0 import.aot Every name is shifted by one slot. __wasm_call_ctors lands on use_tick ’s function, use_tick lands on bounce ’s, and the real bounce loses its name. The relocation view inherits the mistake: the recursive self-call of bounce prints as use_tick -> use_tick . Confident, and wrong. The fix is to stop assuming. Subtract a known import count, and when the count is unknown, say so instead of guessing: ./unaot --no-color import.aot # count unknown ./unaot --no-color --imports 1 import.aot With the correct count the names land on the right functions and bounce -> bounce is the true recursion. With no count the tool prints aot_func#N and tells you why, rather than emitting plausible but wrong names. For reverse engineering that is the safer default: an honest “unknown” beats a confident mislabel. Reading import_func_count straight out of INIT_DATA would remove the flag entirely; that parse is on the list for later. The lesson is an ordinary one: a convenient assumption was true for my test input and false in the field, and only a real device surfaced it. summary piece what it adds corrected TEXT base skip the literal-size field and literal region section-local readers confine reads to the relevant section or string buffer reloc_symbol() symbol index -> validated name func_at() patch location -> containing function span defined_symbol() aot_func#N -> defined-function target --imports N join known global export indices to defined functions relocation output source, target, type, addend, and file locations The main limitations remain explicit. We support format version 5 and ordinary little-endian ELF AOT targets. Function counts still come from the two candidate layouts discussed in part 2; if both validate, the parser rejects the ambiguous result. Export names require a known import count, and function spans can include padding. Only the three listed text-group names receive code-location mapping; other groups are printed without pretending they belong to a function. In part 4 we will bring this information into Ghidra: map the correct native code region, choose its processor, create named functions, and place references on the appropriate instructions. The e8 example shows why copying relocation offsets directly into a disassembler is not enough. I hope this post is useful for reverse engineers, embedded and IoT security researchers, and everyone curious about how WebAssembly really ships on devices. WAMR 2.4.5 release WAMR 2.4.5 AOT loader WAMR 2.4.5 AOT emitter reversing embedded WebAssembly: part 1 reversing embedded WebAssembly: part 2 source code in github - part 3 This is a practical case for educational purposes only. Thanks for your time happy hacking and good bye! PS. All drawings and screenshots are mine

逆向wasm报告 @cocomelonc 原文 ↗
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Multiple Cisco products are affected by vulnerabilities in the Snort 3 Detection Engine that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause the Snort 3 Detection Engine to restart unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory. Cisco has released software updates that address these vulnerabilities. There are no workarounds that address these vulnerabilities. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-snort3-misc-dos-6mB22qAK This advisory is part of a group of advisories. For a complete list of the advisories and links to them, see Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of October 21, 2026, Security Advisories . In addition, for further documentation of improvements and fixes in Open Source Snort 3, see Multiple Cisco Products Snort 3 Security Hardening Release: October 2026 . <br/>Security Impact Rating: Medium <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-20019,CVE-2026-20179,CVE-2026-20197,CVE-2026-76489

dosidscve @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗

Chapter 01 : The Riemann zeta function Recently, a member of staff at Anthropic gave Claude an unreasonable challenge. It was about one of the most famous unsolved problems in mathematics: Take a real stab at the Riemann hypothesis . Claude did take a real stab, but as you might have expected if you’re familiar with the difficulty of the task (the Riemann hypothesis dates back to 1859 and has a million-dollar bounty ), it didn’t succeed. Nevertheless, during its attempt, it unexpectedly made strides on a related problem. An unreleased research version of Claude has improved on a longstanding lower bound for the fraction of zeros of the Riemann zeta function that satisfy the Riemann hypothesis. Drawing on extensive prior research by mathematicians over the past decades, it has increased this bound from 41.6% to 67.2%. Two mathematicians at Anthropic studied and validated Claude’s paper , and produced an informal note for experts stating Claude’s proof concisely. Claude also produced a formally verifiable proof of its result. We are grateful to Brian Conrey and Dan Goldston, two experts in this area, who generously examined the paper on short notice. We don’t expect that the techniques Claude used will lead to proving the Riemann hypothesis. But its work serves as the latest example of the speed of progress in AI models’ mathematical capabilities. In this post, we discuss how Claude approached this problem and what it found. The Riemann zeta function The Riemann zeta function describes the distribution of prime numbers: each place that the function takes the value of zero contributes successively finer detail to the sequence of primes. The Riemann hypothesis is that the zeros that determine the primes all exist along a certain vertical line. This has become one of the most consequential conjectures in mathematics: many results assume it in order to provide a form of randomness in the primes. No one has yet been able to prove or disprove the Riemann hypothesis, but mathematicians have made progress in many related directions studying the Riemann zeta function and its zeros. One of these, as above, is quantifying a minimum proportion of zeros that are on the line: over time, they’ve gradually increased this known constant proportion to 41.6%. Another direction concerns the distribution of zeros on the line. In particular, in 1973, Montgomery introduced a number of new techniques in this area, though these techniques assumed the hypothesis was true. More recently, Aryan , and subsequently Baluyot, Goldston, Suriajaya, and Turnage-Butterbaugh have published a series of works that allow Montgomery’s techniques to work without that assumption, meaning they can support work on increasing the lower-bound constant for the zeros on the line. Claude’s result draws heavily on this line of research, along with a 2000 paper by Bombieri. Claude's finding Claude found that combining the results from Aryan and from Baluyot, Goldston, Suriajaya, and Turnage-Butterbaugh with the work of Bombieri provides a way to surpass the previous state-of-the-art lower-bound proportion of 41.6%, increasing it to 67.2%. A short technical explanation of Claude’s finding is as follows: Claude forms a suitable space of functions with quadratic form induced by Weil, and positive- (respectively negative-)definite subspaces arising from zeros on (respectively off) the line. Then Claude simply writes down an inequality on the rank of a quadratic form in terms of first- and second-moment information. (The successful computation of the latter in terms of the dual picture over primes, or via control of a Hilbert transform, is no surprise in analytic number theory.) The courage to treat the entire space, with positive- and negative-definiteness taken into account together, and with the quadratic form allowed to be non-diagonal, is in some sense the step that allows Claude to achieve the conclusion based on the important prior work. The full technical explanation is available in the paper . Claude’s explanation of how it arrived at its result is available in a separate Appendix here . Claude's methodology An unreleased research version of Claude found the new lower bound over two sessions in Claude Code, using a total of 31 million output tokens. Jarred Sumner, an Anthropic staff member (and non-mathematician), prompted Claude to “take a real stab” at the hypothesis itself, leaving the mathematical choices from there up to the model. Initially, Claude generated and tried 650 ideas, none of which worked. Jarred prompted Claude to try again, and it spent a day and a half coordinating about 60 Claude subagents, which this time went much deeper: between them, they ran 2,400 shell commands and wrote hundreds of Python scripts. 1 The subagents ran thousands of numerical checks against known zeta zeros and refereed one another’s work. Throughout this process, Jarred's input was mostly limited to sending Claude messages of encouragement (mostly variants of “keep going” or “believe in yourself”). 2 This seems to have helped Claude overcome some initial skepticism that it could make meaningful progress. Having found this new result while attempting the task, Claude tested its work by having various subagents review the proofs, search for counterexamples, download 54 papers from the arXiv to check that its finding hadn’t already been made, and independently re-prove its finding from scratch. Claude volunteered to write its findings up as a paper, and recommended that a human number theorist validate its findings. Levent Alpöge and Ralph Furman, two of Anthropic’s own mathematicians, examined Claude’s work to understand the new results and how they related to the prior work mentioned above. In parallel, Claude worked with another member of staff, Eric Easley, to produce a Lean formalization of the result, which passes the standard validation tool comparator . AI models' progress in mathematics This result shows that AI models like Claude can extend the impact and reach of mathematicians’ ideas in new and sometimes surprising ways. Even though it couldn’t resolve the Riemann hypothesis itself, this result emerged as the unintended byproduct of that original request. Even Claude was surprised by its own finding—it was skeptical at first, possibly because it has learned from its training about the difficulty of open problems in mathematics and about the limitations of AI models. But after some encouraging prompts, it arrived at the result we’ve described. Perhaps Claude, like many of us, underestimates the rate of AI progress. Further reading Below is a list of documents that provide more information about Claude’s result: Claude ’ s paper ; Claude ’ s formalization ; Anthropic ’ s informal note stating the proof more concisely ; Claude’s explanation of how it arrived at its result ; Detailed transcripts of Claude's process . Changelog: this post was updated on August 13, 2026, with an updated version of Claude's paper. This paper was revised by Claude to provide a clearer proof and additional historical context. Footnotes 01 Out of the 60 subagents, two were responsible for developing the key mathematical ideas, 13 contributed ideas to these agents, 30 attempted (but were unable) to develop new ideas, 13 served as validators to check the correctness of the arguments, and the final two helped to write the initial paper. 02 A prompt including similar encouragement was used to help Claude disprove the Jacobian conjecture .

llm数学 @anthropic-research 原文 ↗

As part of Cisco's ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, the Cisco Expressway Series software engineering team has conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in a software hardening release that addresses multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing and are not known to be actively exploited. To assist customers in patching and streamline the disclosure process, Cisco has grouped these issues by their underlying vulnerability class - Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) - and assigned a single Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures identifier (CVE ID) to each CWE grouping. Cisco Expressway Series refers to Cisco Expressway Core (Expressway-C) devices and Cisco Expressway Edge (Expressway-E) devices. Note: Cisco may publish separate security advisories that provide additional details about individual vulnerabilities that are addressed in this release. Cisco has released a software update that addresses these vulnerabilities. There are no workarounds that address these vulnerabilities. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-exwy-hardening-FhcqBVcs This advisory is part of a group of advisories. For a complete list of the advisories and links to them, see Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of October 21, 2026, Security Advisories . <br/>Security Impact Rating: High <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-76490,CVE-2026-76491,CVE-2026-76492,CVE-2026-76493,CVE-2026-76494,CVE-2026-76495,CVE-2026-76496,CVE-2026-76497

加固expressway @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗

As part of Cisco's ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, engineering teams for Cisco Emergency Responder, Cisco Prime Collaboration Deployment, Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Unified CM), Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM & Presence Service (Unified CM IM&P), Cisco Unified Communications Manager Session Management Edition (Unified CM SME), and Cisco Unity Connection have conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in software hardening releases that address multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing and are not known to be actively exploited. To assist customers in patching and streamline the disclosure process, Cisco has grouped these issues by their underlying vulnerability class — Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) — and assigned a single Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures identifier (CVE ID) to each CWE grouping. Note: Cisco may publish separate security advisories that provide additional details about individual vulnerabilities that are addressed in this release. Cisco has released software updates that address these vulnerabilities. There are no workarounds that address these vulnerabilities. This advisory is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-voice-hardening-twgbH9e3 This advisory is part of a group of advisories. For a complete list of the advisories and links to them, see Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of October 21, 2026, Security Advisories . <br/>Security Impact Rating: Critical <br/>CVE: CVE-2026-76473,CVE-2026-76474,CVE-2026-76475,CVE-2026-76476,CVE-2026-76477,CVE-2026-76478,CVE-2026-76479,CVE-2026-76481

加固统一通信语音 @cisco-advisory 原文 ↗