头条7
无需修改内存保护属性就能执行载荷,可规避常见注入检测规则
- Scans for existing handles with sufficient access rights
- Finds pre existing RWX memory regions without modifying protections
- Writes shellcode directly into the selected RWX region
- Queues a special user APC for immediate execution
- (Optional)Encrypts shellcode using Speck https://t.co/PqyDCivk2q
进程注入绕过poc
@papadelospapas_
原文 ↗
Agent 处理不可信目标输入即受影响,附统计数据与 TokenExhaust、HoneyAI 防守思路。
RT @JulioUrena: I spent weeks researching AI Pentesting Agents: can they be hacked? Yes. I got RCE on most Pentesting Agents ARTEX, strix, PentestGPT, etc. My research, stats, recommendations + 2 new concepts for Blue Teamers: TokenExhaust & HoneyAI are here:
https://t.co/XyvJ369OkG
ai_agentrce报告
@0xocdsec
原文 ↗
LLM 代理驱动的入侵已完成实战化,同类自建平台需按同一威胁模型加固
RT @FBICyberBranch: Threat actors are weaponizing ARTEX, an open-source, large language model (LLM)-driven agentic platform to automate multiple phases of cyber intrusions at machine speed. Since at least August 2026, a variety of malicious cyber actors have used ARTEX to conduct campaigns targeting organizations globally across multiple sectors, including financial services, government, and technology.
ARTEX significantly reduces the time required to chain attack techniques and enables threat actors with minimal technical expertise to conduct complex, multi-target operations simultaneously.
Today, the FBI released a FLASH highlighting the tactics, techniques, and procedures and indicators of compromise associated with the ARTEX framework. Organizations should follow the mitigation steps outlined in the FLASH to improve their security posture in response to ARTEX and similar agentic SI frameworks: https://t.co/l9lgbqWNYk
ai_agentllm事件
@artem_i_baranov
原文 ↗
把 AI 攻击步骤拆成可复用的攻击树,可直接用于自测 agent 抗攻击能力
"Automating AI Hacking with Tree of Attack"
https://t.co/GJPKrzQxtQ
#infosec #llm https://t.co/arKrBv1oFN
ai_agentllm报告
@0xor0ne
原文 ↗
BYOVD 提权链仍能绕过现有黑名单,攻击者可直接复用。
RT @zer0matt_: Phoenix: a zero-day that escalates privileges.
The driver is loaded with no issue and is not listed on either https://t.co/m5Fg6oHoNq or the Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist. https://t.co/O0Gb4nS6Gq
lpebyovdwindows
@0xocdsec
原文 ↗
自建 C2/agent 的底层机制被完整拆解,可直接照做。
RT @mqst_: An Introduction to Linux Internals For Building C2 Agents From Scratch
Blog: https://t.co/LVBHkmXLYv
Author: @jm33_m0 https://t.co/Lb0tEfxqwT
现成检测规则可直接部署,覆盖 ARTEX 及其 AWS 分支 AntiFox 的具体行为。
RT @malwaremustdie: #ARTEX signature detection pack #updates v1.1.0 is out (#MMD-072-2026), built from running own #Playbook (works well!) w/more tests against recent network traffic dataset, have improvements summarized below:
• Rename-proof webshell rules (upload → execute, any filename)
• Windows coverage: IIS/PHP workers spawning shells, script drops
• AWS rules for AntiFox, an ARTEX fork (secrets/IAM/S3 sweeps)
• OAuth high-privilege consent + Graph recon (Sentinel)
• LLM-API egress policy rules for servers
• IP IOCs: 90-day alert window, then hunt-only
• New durability labels D0/D1/D2 + mutation testing
*) RC1 rules unchanged. Known gaps documented, not hidden.
*) Read Blog(Appendix E), Changelog in v1.1.0
*) Remember #BehaviorFirst, #FightAIwithAI
*) Thanks to friends who shared/sent their recent traffic,
Links: Blog(Appendix E): https://t.co/xxOdSawqCz
GitHub(same): https://t.co/Ep6kJjb7UO
Comments(same thread): https://t.co/yFlOowD5OB
#malwaremustdie - @unixfreaxjp
必看9
自托管 LLM 应用可复用搜索、OCR、语音能力,降低搭建成本
RT @MaxForAI: 🚨DeepSeek居然把他们整个App也开源了。。。。
刚刚 @deepseek_ai 正式发布全家桶应用API,直接把DeepSeek App里几乎所有的功能都开放给开发者了。
包括联网搜索、深度思考搜索、文件解析、阅读链接、语音交互,以及OCR、ASR、TTS等底层能力。
甚至官方还直接开源了一套完整的聊天前端Demo,支持导入DeepSeek历史对话。
也就是说,现在开发者拿着DeepSeek的API,基本就能1:1复刻一个DeepSeek App。
DeepSeek在公告最后还专门表示:「DeepSeek现有的对话产品只是较为基础的一种形态。现在,官方产品背后的各项能力均已支持通过 DeepSeek API 随心调用、自由组合,我们期待开发者能够借此省去重复的基础工作,打造出更多样、更极致、更具想象力的产品。欢迎使用 DeepSeek API,尽情创造。」
现在各家AI公司都在拼命做自己的超级入口,想方设法把用户留在自家App里。
DeepSeek倒好,直接把自己App背后的能力全部开放出来,连复刻方案都给你准备好了。
你想做一个自己的DeepSeek?可以。
你想把DeepSeek的搜索、语音、文件处理能力拆出来,重新组合成一个新产品?也可以。
甚至可以在DeepSeek已有的能力之上,做出比官方App更复杂的产品。
这才是这次发布最值得关注的地方,DeepSeek对自己在AI生态里要扮演什么角色,似乎想得很清楚。
就是下次能不能别在北京时间的周五晚十点发布了。。。。
llmai_agent工具
@kernullist
原文 ↗
进程注入是主流恶意软件的基础手法,本文对检测与绕过的细节值得参考
RT @SpiderMorpheus: Process Injection is one of the most fundamental capabilities of malware. It plays a role both in establishing a foothold after initial access and during post-exploitation, but the technique suffers from a fundamental problem: its traditional behavior is predictable and well understood by defensive solutions.
The classic Remote Process Injection flow can be roughly summarized in four stages:
1. Enumerate processes on the compromised machine;
2. Obtain a handle to the target process;
3. Allocate and write shellcode into the target process's memory space;
4. Change the memory region's permissions from RW to RX.
The set of WINAPIs designed for these operations is relatively small, which makes life easier for EDRs. The list of the most sensitive APIs is short:
VirtualAllocEx → NtAllocateVirtualMemory
VirtualProtectEx → NtProtectVirtualMemory
WriteProcessMemory → NtWriteVirtualMemory
Whether through kernel callbacks or userland hooks on ntdll, these calls are easily monitored. There are ways to deal with this problem, including simply not performing process injection, at least not during initial access, and choosing something like DLL Sideloading. But we want a challenge, right? :)
In the screenshot I show something different. It is possible to write into a remote process's memory without invoking sensitive APIs such as NtAllocateVirtualMemory or NtWriteVirtualMemory.
Based on an article written by the amazing researcher @TwoSevenOneT, I developed a shellcode runner that successfully evades Windows Defender (with Cloud-Delivered Protection enabled) by poisoning a target process hStdInput. The technique abuses Windows console applications (such as netsh.exe) by redirecting the child process's hStdInput handle via CreateProcess with STARTF_USESTDHANDLES. The content written to the Named Pipe ends up allocated in the target process's memory by the operating system itself, with no explicit call to VirtualAllocEx or WriteProcessMemory.
To locate the shellcode in remote memory, the payload is preceded by a previously established byte sequence that serves as a marker. The runner scans the target process's memory for this pattern, identifies the region, adjusts permissions, and redirects execution to the shellcode.
None of the most sensitive APIs are used for writing the payload. Three APIs that are also used, among other purposes, in traditional injection are present (VirtualProtectEx, CreateProcessW, and ResumeThread), but outside their traditional context they are far less suspicious.
Currently, this shellcode runner PoC would not successfully evade top-tier EDRs, but the goal was to demonstrate viability, not perfection. A little bit more evasion tomfoolery would be enough.
The link to the article that guided me through this experiment will be down below, make sure to do something useful with your life and read it.
Keep Hacking,
Sp1d3rM_*!^
AI 编码基础设施被逐层穿透,凭据与插件分发构成关键攻击面。
RT @hrkrshnn: This is a crazy report.
1) Fireworks breach
2) Traces from Cursor users exposed
3) Traces had customer credentials
4) Cursor credentials were also exposed
5) Attacker replaced Claude Code inside Cursor marketplace with the cursor credentials.
The attackers are really after AI infrastructure. Ruthless.
供应链ai_agent事件
@cyb3rops
原文 ↗
宏、ISO、LNK 被堵后 MSC 成为新入口,漏洞八年未补,检测思路可直接借鉴。
RT @0xpwnie: Microsoft blocked Office macros in 2022. Attackers moved to ISO files. Microsoft fixed ISO files. Attackers moved to LNK and OneNote. Microsoft closed those too. By mid-2024 attackers had landed on MSC files, the administrative console files used by IT teams to manage Windows systems. GrimResource exploits a cross-site scripting vulnerability in apds.dll that was reported in 2018 and never patched. The sample that exposed the technique was a red team payload accidentally uploaded to VirusTotal by a blue team analyst who picked it up during an assessment. When it first landed on VirusTotal on June 6 2024, zero antivirus engines flagged it.
即被滥用的那套代理平台可自由获取,自托管此类工具即承担同等暴露面
RT @C0d3Cr4zy: Artex by @getfailsafe
https://t.co/Z61mnrqKX5
ai_agentllm工具
@artem_i_baranov
原文 ↗
AI 辅助入侵下单条告警失效,关联检测成为阻断关键。
RT @SBousseaden: AI-assisted intrusions aren't just about speed.
In this CyberStrikeAI case, 78 low/medium severity AWS alerts across 16 days highlight why high-signal correlation matter: connecting weaker signals to detect and disrupt an intrusion before it progresses.
https://t.co/KJHGDpJjtm
ai_agent云事件
@cyb3rops
原文 ↗
自建服务与 agent 回连可在无端口映射下建通道,开箱可用。
gsocket — Connect like there is no firewall. Securely. https://t.co/c8SUuslKjt https://t.co/SSKrNtGLX5
官方确认开源智能体攻击框架被规模化滥用,防御方可据其手法反查自身环境。
ok so the FBI put out a FLASH alert about artex being used at scale in the wild. artex is on github, owned by microsoft. so, the offensive open source tools debate is effectively over right?
https://t.co/BXEOkmbaRK
ai_agent事件工具
@Teach2Breach
原文 ↗
把 AI Agent 直接当攻击框架剖析,与自托管 Agent 的暴露面和误用风险重合。
RT @pentest_swissky: ARTEX and Friends: Enter Agentic Offensive Frameworks - Google Threat Intelligence Group / @Mandiant
https://t.co/5WAa4NqAhi
ai_agentllm报告
@domchell
原文 ↗
推荐15
自建服务可复用其认证与会话逻辑,减少自研实现出错
better-auth v1.7.25 — The most comprehensive authentication framework https://t.co/EE1qDyOYoi https://t.co/Srq0rACbQo
渗透 Agent 会接触目标凭据,后门疑云决定其能否在生产中使用。
RT @oneandonlyhusam: I'm reversing ARTEX Live on twitch to address Backdoor rumors and api key theft!
https://t.co/CuAlntqyyD
ai_agent逆向事件
@0xpwnie
原文 ↗
Linux、Android 上开箱即用,可排查 Agent 出网流量或做取证。
ecapture v2.11.0 — Capture SSL/TLS plaintext with eBPF—no MITM proxy or custom CA installation. Supports Linux and Android on x86_64\arm64 and loong64. https://t.co/RHoj7fMILf https://t.co/AFF4prCPUh
嵌入式 Web 服务器装量巨大,三处 TLS 缺陷可直接影响服务端加密信任
''Choose Your Backend: Three TLS Bugs in GoAhead - FoxIO | Cyber Innovation''
#infosec #pentest #redteam #blueteam
https://t.co/WA5wRDjOaa
tls漏洞固件
@CyberWarship
原文 ↗
移动内核驱动越界可导向提权,细节与复现路径已公开
RT @nasm_re: Multiple out-of-bounds in the rmnet driver shipped in the recent Xiaomi 18 HyperOS releases: https://t.co/opGicw6ls1
API 仍是主要攻击面,文中给出可直接复用的测试流程
How to hack APIs in 2026 - @hakluke
https://t.co/IsXvnguoEu
api渗透测试报告
@pentest_swissky
原文 ↗
NAS 常暴露公网,MCP 接口让 agent 直接执行审计与修复
synology-nas-cli — Zero-dependency Python CLI and MCP server for Synology DSM 7 that audits NAS configuration against the C3RB3R/.L0CK3D ransomware campaign, plans fixes, and applies them. https://t.co/nTebkPQkCC https://t.co/5GZ02CYL1l
工具ai_agent加固
@KitPloit
原文 ↗
无需密钥即可跑完整调查流程,明显降低 OSINT 上手门槛
OsintHunter — 🎯 The ultimate OSINT toolkit: investigation graph, confidence scoring, alias families, map, timeline and reports. 49 modules, 400+ sites, no API keys required. https://t.co/yCYHjHcleQ https://t.co/R7o1KG4qZl
内存植入体分析长期缺工具,可实时观察堆变化有增量
Released in GitHub! Realtime heap analysis tool for Windows implant research and malware analysis. (May contain bugs, AI generated)
https://t.co/pxaRzRs60x
工具恶意软件windows
@papadelospapas_
原文 ↗
Rust 标准库并非零风险,缺陷沿 crate 生态向下游二进制扩散。
RT @yechan_bae: I had an honor of writing the first blog post in Microsoft FORGE Lab's blog. In the post, I introduce memory safety bugs I recently found and reported in the Rust standard library.
https://t.co/669hLbtHgU
内存安全rust报告
@0xocdsec
原文 ↗
车机硬件脱离整车后的攻击面与调试路径被完整公开。
RT @0xrootRE: Tesla Model 3's Brain on a Desk
By @xdavidhu
https://t.co/z6KWIc4Ywp https://t.co/xdgIuLMP99
把投入从「挡住初始访问」转向遏制,可压低入侵后的爆炸半径。
RT @dinodaizovi: This is the thing that I think organizations should be *most* focused on. You all run a ton of 3rd-party code that is mostly outside of your control, but here is what is in your control: containing and slowing down compromises *after* initial access to remain a size that you can manage.
Your number one goal should be eliminating possibilities for lateral movement and global privilege escalation (i.e. different than LPEs).
季度威胁全景可用来校准检测规则与处置优先级。
RT @elasticseclabs: @soolidsnakee 2026 Threat Command quarterly report: https://t.co/dwO2fkVfap
引用真实故障编号显著提高可信度,故障后 24 小时内为钓鱼高发窗口。
RT @MsftSecIntel: Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed an active phishing campaign exploiting the Microsoft 365 service disruption on November 12. The messages impersonate Microsoft 365 service health notifications and reference the legitimate Exchange Online incident EX1550543.
Some of the phishing emails Microsoft detected on November 13 falsely claim that messages were held during the outage and will be deleted within 24 hours unless recipients click to restore them.
Observed subjects follow the pattern "Outage - [six-character code]," with sender display names using organization-specific prefixes followed by "Outage Notification" or "Service Health."
The campaign uses three sender domains, moments-notice[.]com, planetmaison[.]com, and newbooker[.]com, with recipient-specific SendGrid click-tracking links redirecting to reallifeaccounting[.]com, including the observed path /themelist0.html. Similar messages targeted organizations across multiple US sectors.
The activity is consistent with credential phishing, although credential collection and malware delivery have not been confirmed.
Security teams can use Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Threat Explorer and Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting (EmailEvents, EmailUrlInfo, and UrlClickEvents) to identify suspicious messages, examine embedded URLs, and investigate user clicks.
Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Safe Links provides time-of-click protection against malicious URLs when properly configured. Organizations should verify their Safe Links policies, investigate potential user interactions, and confirm service disruptions directly through the Microsoft 365 admin center.
提供固件逆向与模拟执行的可复用脚手架,思路可迁移到其他嵌入式目标。
sony-a6400-research — Clean-room execution environment and research harness for Sony BIONZ X camera firmware, with ARM emulation, hardware contracts, and reverse-engineering prototypes. https://t.co/0PM7q1G5pO https://t.co/MsFcH7VjZV
更多28
I need one of those SRDs and I'll do baseband for one year
RT @0xLupin: The CEO of a pretty big company challenged me to hack them and right now pulling an all nighter hacking. Already found different ways to backdoor them but I won't stop until there is a giga crit. Will report back.
It's fun coming back to some old school hacking <3
针对 Apple 为高风险用户提供的防护做跨版本实测,可用来检验现有加固措施
RT @naehrdine: We got two publications accepted at CCS, to be presented next week 🎉
Blue Bubbles, Red Flags: Investigating Privacy Leakage in Apple iMessage
https://t.co/KQqNzqy7kV
Dissecting Apple's Lockdown Mode: A Cross-Platform, Multi-Version Analysis
https://t.co/GVoDRyrqwy
AI 辅助挖洞压缩攻防时间差,直接影响对自建组件补丁节奏的预期。
RT @natashenka: In the age of AI, 90 days isn’t fast enough. Today, Project Zero updated our disclosure policy to reflect the changes needed to protect users in this new world.
https://t.co/7xGtVypUga
cve报告
@pentest_swissky
原文 ↗
官方通报的在野手法,社工链条完整,可据此调整验证流程。
In the 'FaceStealer' campaign, North Korean operators combine pre-recorded webcam footage of previous victims with AI deepfakes of industry figures to make fake video calls look authentic. Rather than engaging in live conversation where a target might ask verification questions, the hackers immediately simulate a broken microphone. The call appears continuous for just a few seconds; long enough to build visual trust before a chat prompt tricks the victim into installing malware to "fix" the audio.
https://t.co/WiWvbuMvoq
关键算力设施连续被攻破,攻击路径与影响范围仍待披露。
RT @realNyarime: 继天津超算被黑后,无锡超算同样被黑 https://t.co/UNfeJ0Eqbu
macOS 恶意软件模块逆向的具体进展,附可直接复用的解密样本。
RT @noarfromspace: @patrickwardle Turns out the replicator_finder module just added support for the new .xcproj file format, using the xcrun xcodeproj tool!
I posted the decrypted and deobfuscated module here: https://t.co/mVvWDTB11M
逆向恶意软件
@patrickwardle
原文 ↗
现成的真实漏洞案例库,适合对照自查与学习利用链。
RT @Dinosn: Top disclosed reports from HackerOne
https://t.co/qC25o8hw9V
报告工具
@artem_i_baranov
原文 ↗
针对 JS 运行时打包件的逆向工具稀少,演示过程可复现。
RT @tonbistudio: REA got a big upgrade!
I did a quick video showing some of the new formats you can now reverse engineer, plus a live demo running REA on a bun executable file!
Check it out! https://t.co/wYP79A0yNE
RT @imjustnewatai: Google krypton coming next week.
Fable 5.2 level but cheaper.
RT @v4bel: 23eaaff88a99869eef3d243b1899e99ffd5820765683561b3750112ee5a67576
RT @reatools: v6.9
try it out!
逆向分析可被代理全程托管,二进制分析的人力成本结构将改变
Coming soon to Hex-Rays IDA Assist: full manual and agentic orchestration of the entire lifecycle of headless IDA instances, of which all are wired into the Assist Mesh. https://t.co/j8rz15tVN7
RT @HackingLZ: Externally, Artex and similar frameworks run tools like Nmap, Nuclei, httpx, Katana, and ffuf to build context. These tools are very noisy. Act accordingly.
ai_agent侦察
@0xTriboulet
原文 ↗
RT @OpenBinAI: OpenBin update! 🔧
• Ghidra-style function tree: Functions, Imports, Thunks, auto-grouped by prefix
• Data XREFs: click through to every function that references a symbol
• Syntax-colored, clickable Program Listing
• Smarter pseudocode colors
https://t.co/Sbxod6E6Wa https://t.co/RBm4XGyPap
https://t.co/QEZdW6uDpJ
The way that @DEATHCon2026 runs is really impressive. So many good workshops so far, and deserves more attention.
Normal people: how i met your mother 🙂
Anime/Manga People: how i met your soulmate 🥰
Windows Researchers: How i met your beacon 🧯🔥💀
RT @yyyyyy_public: Bad Apple!!
(SpringBoard) https://t.co/iOWCx0C4cE
RT @MKBHD: Alright chat I’m in. Here’s the deal
Cybercab order page is live. Invite only. Must accept delivery to one of these cities in Texas. Only operates in those existing geofenced areas. Requires a $300 monthly subscription to operate. One vehicle per customer. “Estimated delivery” December
消费科技
@artem_i_baranov
原文 ↗
披露窗口变化会直接改变补丁与利用之间的时间差,影响所有依赖上游修复的部署。
RT @natashenka: In the age of AI, 90 days isn’t fast enough. Today, Project Zero updated our disclosure policy to reflect the changes needed to protect users in this new world.
https://t.co/7xGtVypUga
cve报告漏洞披露
@alkalinesec
原文 ↗
赏金评级不等于实际危害,浏览器漏洞的修补优先级不能只按厂商定级来排。
Not just sandbox escapes. Plenty of Chrome bugs that Google no longer deems bounty-worthy can attack a higher-value system than a random user’s internet browser
说明内置编码器已被签名后,最小代价的自建混淆改造路径。
RT @SpiderMorpheus: Funny enough, basically the only three things I did to the original PoC was:
- Writing it in C, because we love C
- Adding Dynamic API Resolution for some APIs (honestly, for defender I feel like this has been an overkill for this specific technique but I am working on a complete version so I threw it there)
- Meterpreter shellcode was encoded using IPv6fuscation instead of one of the baked-in encoders because the encoders themselves are signatured as fuck
绕过pocshellcode
@0xpwnie
原文 ↗
自研虚拟化边界的设计取舍,对评估云与虚拟化隔离假设有参考价值。
RT @oxidecomputer: Why Did Oxide Build Its Own Hypervisor? FAQ Friday #68 https://t.co/9dCKQi5FFZ
uBlock v1.76.3b0 — Wide-spectrum content blocker for browsers that blocks ads, trackers, coin miners, and malicious sites using filter lists and customizable privacy rules. https://t.co/KkKaYznks0 https://t.co/OdNi84pzzP
Smart people in my phone, I got my hands on a Asus GX-10 - what models/harness/pipeline do you guys use for vuln research/red team stuff which can run on a single spark? https://t.co/yL975WKWl0
ai_agentllm工具
@whokilleddb
原文 ↗
how do we feel about this new AWS UI, asides from being flash banged, I think it's pretty nice https://t.co/IS2HNQdtxS
RT @AdamCohen8: OEL just hit 50 stars! Thank you!! https://t.co/aTXhPQXPBy